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PREFACE 
Entering federal politics after a political career 
in Tasmania that had been notable for his record tenure 
of party leadership and his respected achievements as 
Premier, Joseph Aloysius Lyons became one of the most 
significant participants in the Depression crisis, led 
one of the three great desertions from the Labour Party, 
participated in the preliminaries for the Second World 
War, and died in office only two weeks short of W.M. 
Hughes' record term as Prime Minister. Yet, although 
he has been dead for nearly thirty years, this thesis 
is the first detailed examination of his political 
career; before it was begun, no attempt had been made 
even to discover whether he had left any personal papers. 
Probably the 1 unprogressive 1 nature of his federal 
government coupled with the earlier lack of original 
source material have been significant barriers to the 
study of the United Australia Party. However, even if 
his career in state politics might have been of interest 
only to patriotic Tasmanians, it is difficult to understand 
why no examination has been mad6 of Lyons' till then 
unprecedented success as a federal political leader. 
Indeed, the very charges sometimes made that he was 
incapable of effective leadership immediately pose the 
questions of how one who was allegedly so ineffectual 
could have been the unchallenged leader for so long of 
men who clearly were not ineffectual, of how he could 
have re·tained public support, and of how he could have 
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had such a marked influence on two of the main policy 
issues of the time, the Depression and compulsory 
military training. 
/ 
While there are" many problems to be overcome when 
v 
writing near-contemporary history, there are also some 
advantages not available to later scholars. Apart from 
the use of some personal papers, notably those of E.D.A. 
Bagot and Staniforth Ricketson, that might not have been 
available to future researchers, the opportunity to 
interview surviving participants o±' Lyons 1 period in 
state and federal politics has been always useful and 
sometimes extremely valuable. Although caution must be 
exercised in using these recollections, some interviews 
provided information that was not to be found in any 
written source, and many of the interpretations 
suggested were stimulating. In particular, interviews 
with Dame Enid Lyons and Staniforth Ricketson provided 
information that was essential for an understanding of 
Lyons 1 career. 
Being a political biography, the thesis deliberately 
ignores Lyons' personal life except where it affected his 
political work, while the general history of his period 
in politics is used to provide a necessary background to 
his actions, but is not examined in detail. Therefore, 
when discussing both his Tasmanian and federal careers, 
the only legislation covered is that which reveals Lyons 1 
concepts, his methods as a policy-maker and leader, or 
his general political style. In this way, the thesis is 
always concentrated on Lyons 1 political leadership, 
without being side-tracked into a study o:f the wider 
aspects o:f politics and legislative policy at that time. 
I 
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Ji'or two-thirds of his political career, Lyons was 
a party leader, and therefore his public statements 
almost invariably revealed party or government policy, 
which did not always correspond with his own opinions. 
Al though occasionally his personal policies were 
revealed in a brief remark in the House or to journalists, 
in general these can be most reliably discovered from 
manuscript sources alone. Fortunately, most of his own 
papers covering his federal career have survived, and 
in such papers of his colleagues as are currently avail-
able for reference there is much information of value. 
However, some important gaps exist, as is unavoidable 
in near-contemporary history; in particular, the papers 
of Lord Bruce, Lord Casey, and Sir Robert Menzies can be 
expected to add further details to the picture of Lyons 
drawn in this thesis. Unfortunately, some manuscript 
material that would have been of significance has been 
destroyed; the absence of private papers covering his 
Tasmanian career coupled with the destruction in ·19L~4. 
of all the records of the United Australia Party have 
made it more difficult to understand the state and 
federal political environments in which he worked. Not 
unexpectedly, any records of the National Union and the 
Consultative Council that might still exist are not 
available. Access was not granted to some papers in 
private hands or held by libraries; in particular, 
access was given to only a small part of Sir Earle Page 1 s 
large collection. As well, the thesis was written before 
the publication of' Sir Frederick Shedden• s study of 
Australian defence policy; based on official files, this 
book is believed to prove that Lyons took a far more 
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active role in the detailed planning of defence expansion 
in the late thirties than was apparent from contemporary 
newspapers and parliamentary debates, Sir Robert Menzies' 
Afternoon Light, expectedly unilluminating about the 
inner politic al history of the thirties and expectedly 
benign in its judgments of Lyons, was published after 
the ·thesis was completed. However, the information as 
yet unavailable is not expected to alter the conclusions 
reached in this thesis. 
A note of the choice of the words used in this 
thesis. Of necessity, such words as 'inflationary', 
'deflationary', 'moderate' 1 and 'appeasement' have been 
used when appropriate, as no other words are suitable. 
It must be emphasized that these words are not being 
used with the meanings they have acquired in political 
controversy, and that no mo!al approval or disapproval 
of particular views or actions is implied by their use. 
The people J isted below kindly gave access to 
documents in their care: the Hon. Dame Enid Lyons, 
Lady Jean Page, Sir Archibald Grenfell Price, the Rt. Hon. 
A.A. Calwell, the Rt. Hon. E. J. Holloway, Mrs Albert 
Levitt, Messrs. E.D.A. Bagot, Ulrich Ellis, L.F. 
Fitzhardinge, P.F. Pearce, Staniforth Ricketson, Ernest 
Turnbul 1, and the Commonweal th Treasury, the Prime 
Minister 1 s Department, the library of the Melbourne 
Herald, the National Library o:f Australia, the La Trobe 
Library, the Queensland University Library, the Library 
Board of' Western Australia, the Tasmanian State Archives, 
the Australian National University Archives, and the 
llbrary o:f' the Australian War Memorial, Canberra. 
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Interviews with the following people were of 
considerable value~ the Hon. Dame Enid Lyons, Dame 
Elisabeth Murdoch, Sir Robert Cosgrove, Sir Frederick 
Shedden, the Rt. Hon. E.J. Holloway, the Hons. F.B. 
Edwards, J. Allan Guy, N. J. O. Makin, and V, C. Thompson, 
and Messrs. J.A. Alexander, E.D.A. Bagot, E.H. Cox, 
R~L. Curthoys, R. Irvine Douglas, Ulrich Ellis, F.C. 
Green, H.C. Green, P.R. Reydon, H.W. Horsfield, Alex 
Marshall, A. W. Paul, Staniforth Ricketson, ILA. Standish, 
M.M. Threlfall, and Ernest Turnbull. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
The following abbreviations have been used in the 
footnotes in this thesis. 
C.P.D. 
Caucus Minutes 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates 
Minutes of the Federal Parliamentary 
Labour Party 
Lyons Papers ( C • .A.) Lyons Papers held by the Commonweal th 
Archives 
Moffat Diary Diary of' Jay Pierrepont Mo:f:fat 
Price, 'Rough Notes' A.G. Price, 'Rough Notes on the 
History of the Emergency Conunittee 
of South Australia', n.d. [1932] 
S.M.H. Sydney Morning Herald 
SYNOPSIS 
The :first chapter covers the Tasmanian career of 
Joseph Aloysius Lyons. After examining his early 
interest in politics and the formative influences on 
his early political thinlcing, it describes his entry 
x 
in 1909 as a Labour member into the Tasmanian parliament. 
His rapid success in state politics is then traced as he 
becomes successively a minister, Leader of the 
Opposition, and then Premier :from 1923 to 1928. His 
changing politica~. concepts are discussed, especially 
in the light of the socialism debate of' 1919-1921. 
After the main events of' his Premiership along with 
the principal :features of' his leadership are discussed, 
the latter is assessed in conjunction with the 
political philosophy he derived :from his twenty years 
in state parliament in the light of' their influence on 
his role in :federal politics. The chapter ends with 
his entry into the Scullin Government. 
The next two chapters cover the two years of the 
ScuLl in Government. The f'irst chapter :follows lIO\\I', as 
a minister soon dissatisfied with his party and its 
policies, he refused to heed Caucus' resolutions on 
:financial policy once he was appointed Acting Treasurer. 
After Scullin returned from England to support Theodore 
and not Lyons, lt traces how Lyons changed. parties with 
the assistance o:f businessmen and the Nationalist 
organization. The reasons f'or his decision to leave the 
party he had served for so long are examined. The third 
·ii 
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chapter descr:l.bes and explains his rapid rise to be 
Leader of the Opposition, and shows the decline of the 
Scullin Government in the latter part of 1931. After 
describing the growing political strength of the new 
United Australia Party, the chapter concludes with 
its victory in the December election. 
Chapter Four discusses his relations with the 
various extra-parliamentary forces that were influential 
during his Prime Ministership. The influences o:f 
individuals and groups is evaluated, as is their 
assistance or hindrance of his leadership. Chapter 
Five, after examining the qualities o:f his senior 
colleagues and tracing the gener«l pplitical history 
of his government, deals with his skills as a politician. 
In particular, it shows hie success as a conciliator of 
:factions within the government, as a parliamentarian, as 
the spokesman f'or,Cabinet 1 and as an election-winner. 
To explain his success, it examines his personality, the 
contrast of his political expertise with his politically 
inexperienced and unskilled colleagues, and the political 
climate of the thirties. As a partial explanation of' his 
declining leadership in the late thirties, the nervous 
strain and recurring ill-heal th that handicapped him is 
noted. 
Chapter Six is concerned with his role in the :framing 
o:f policy. Noting how he retained his reformist 
'Tasmanian Labour 1 outlook. in contrast to the unimaginative 
conservatism of' many o:f his colleagues, it shows the 
:frequent concessions over policy that he was forced to 
make. His influence in policy-making is assessed :from 
both a short-term and a long-term perspective, and 
xii 
particular instances of his participation in decision-
making are used to illustrate his methods and his 
failings. The seventh and final chapter covers the 
last year of his life, as he attempted to retire and 
thereby end the by then unhappy experience of leader-
ship. His reasons for wishing to retire, for opposing 
R.G. Menzies' claims on the leadership, and for his 
inability to find a successor are discussed. The 
chapter ends with his physical collapse and premature 
death brought about by the strain created by his failure 
to overcome his difficulties. 
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Chapter 1 
TASMANIA 
Joseph Aloysius Lyons was born on 15 September 1879 
at Stanley, in north-western Tasmania, the son of Irish-
Catholic parents. He was educated at a Catholic school, 
but when nine years old his father's mental breakdown 
made it necessary for him to work after school hou.rs to 
help support the family. His schooling would have ended 
when he was twelve had not two aunts sent him to the 
Stanley stb.te school, where he did well, becoming a 
pupil.'..teacher in 1 895. In 1901 he was appointed to two 
schools in the southern midlands, where he boarded with 
• 
the Lyne family. Here he may have met Sir William Lyne, 
a former Premier of New South Wales then in federal 
politics. William's brother, Carmichael, was involved 
in Tasmanian politics, and boarding with the Lynes 
stimulated for the first timE;i Lyons' interest in local 
affairs. 
Until then, under his mother's influence, he had 
been more interested in the problems of Ireland than of' 
Tasmania, 1 but the feudal atmosphere of' the Lyne estate 
made him conscj_ous of the social and economic injustices 
existing in Tasmu1.;::1..a. Contact with locrd and mainland 
politicians visiting the Lynes made him consider entering 
EnidM. Lyons, So We Take Comfort (London, 1965), p.h,5; 
~-~' 20 November 1930. 
1 
2 
politics himself. 1 However, not till he was teaching at 
Smithton for seven months in 1905-6 did he involve himself 
actively in politics by help1ng to found a debating 
society and a branch of the Tasmanian Workers' Political 
2 League, as the Labour Party was then named. From this 
date he began to attend Labour meetings in Hobart and 
Launceston. 3 
He spent 1907 at the new Teachers' Training College 
in Hobart, where he matriculated. His political horizons 
were broadened when he joined a political discussion 
group conducted by the Denison branch of the Labour 
F. 
Party; L.)i(. Giblin was one of its most prominent 
participants. In 1908, he taught at Launceston, and in 
March was elected to the committee of the Launcesten No. 
2 branch of the W.P.L. But after criticisms were made 
of his performance as a teacher, he was demoted; 4 
feeling unfairly treated, he joined with other dissidents 
in criticizing the Director of Education at the July 
conference of the state school teachers' union.5 He was 
elected as one of a delegation of teachers to the Director, 
but his demotion was not rescinded. 
His political activities increased in the latter 
half of 1908. In September, he helped to establish a 
1 Mercu1~y 1 4 June 1932. 
2 Clirrner, 3 July 1909, p. 5; Lyons, p. 56. 
3 Cli2:eer, 26 June 1909, p.7. 
4 Inspectors' Reports for 1908, Tasmania, Education 
Department, 110/765; Director of Education, quoted in 
Examin~, 17 October 1908, p.9. 
5 Mercury, J July 1908, p.6. 
3 
W.P.L. branch at Perth, near Launceston, and in October 
was elected Treasurer of the Wilmot Divisional Council. 
Also in October, his first political speeches were 
delivered at two small villages on the north-west coast. 
The local press reported him to be a fluent speaker, and 
his topics included closer settlement, land valuation, 
education, factory and workers' compensation legislation, 
and an attack on the Legislative Council for rejecting 
1 democratic measures. These open criticisms of the 
government by a public servant who advertised himself 
2 
as 1Mr J.A. Lyons, of the Education Department', angered 
the Premier, who unsuccessfully attempted to prevent 
public servants from openly engaging in politics.3 
During the resulting publicity, Lyons was accepted as 
one of the Labour candidates for Wilmot. This was 
Tasmania's most conservative electorate, predominately 
rural in character but containing some mining and 
railway towns, in several of which he had taught. 
After finishing teaching on 12 March 1909, he bicycled 
around Wilmot seeking election. The voting, on 30 April, 
gave Labou~ twelve of the thirty seats in the House of 
Assembly, against seven out of thirty-five in the old 
House. In Wilmot, Lyrms was third on· primary votes; 
he was to represent this seat continuously in state and 
federal politics for the next thirty years. 
1 North-Western Advocate and the Emu Bay Times, 8 
October 1908, p.2, and 10 October 1908, p.2. 
2 North-Western Advocate and the Emu Bay Times, 6 
October 1908, p.J, and 9 October 1908, p.3. 
J Mercury, 16 October 1908, p.7, 17 October 1908, p.6, 
and JO October 1908, pp.6-7. 
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Lyons, then aged twenty-nine, was almost unknown to 
his new parliamentary colleagues, and did not attend his 
first W.P.L. Conference until June 1909, after his· 
election to parliament. 1 However, the 'ever-pleasant Joe' 
soon made his mark on the movement. With his warm and 
gregarious personality, and his enthusiasm and eagerness 
to serve the party, he made friends far more easily than 
he made enemies, and soon became very popular. Realizing 
the gaps in his knowledge, caused by the poverty of' the 
education system of his day, he sought to learn from men 
with greater understanding and experience of subjects 
that concerned him. Though a wide reader, he was 
probably influenced more by the people he talked with 
than the books he read. His political beliefs are 
difficult to discern, for in default of' documentary 
material on the early Tasmanian party we have to rely on 
the inadequate press reports of his speeches. On some 
questions his views are unknown or only partly known. 
Assuming that his speeches reflect and do not deliberately 
disguise his real beliefs, they suggest that he was 
idealistic, humanitarian, and rather confused. Having 
strong political emotions rather than Drecise political 
doctrines, in his early enthusiasm he endorsed most or 
all of Labour's platform without question. His reformist 
~~ .. 
philosophy and its expression in his fundamental political 
objectives were based mainly on an emotional reaction to 
Tasmanian conditions; there is no evidence of' a 
consciously analytical development of' an intellectually 
coherent and consistent framework 0£ ideas, but rather 
Clipper, 29 May 1909, p. l~. 
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an enthusiastic adoption of a party whose policies 
promised to alleviate and eventually to remove the evils 
he saw in Tasmanian society. 
Besides his enthusiasm and idealism, he had a 
pragmatic approach to everyday issues. These he could 
easily comprehend and analyse, but on more general and 
theoretical questions he tended in his early political 
life to be carried away with enthusiasm for a noble 
ideal without fully understanding its implications. 
This dichotomy persisted until after 1921 1 when he 
realized that his enthusiasm for socialism was mistaken. 
With no pretensions to being an 'intellectual', he 
retained an affinity with the ordinary man throughout 
his career, and quickly came to understand and later to 
master the art of politics. He became, for all his 
idealism, basically a pragmatic politician, losing 
interest in most theoretical and doctrinal arguments, 
never losing his ideals but always seeking to do what 
was feasible and being prepared to compromise if 
necessary and if thereby he did not negate his basic 
beliefs. He· sought power not for its own sake, but to 
improve Tasmanian economic and social conditions, and 
his sense of duty to his electors impelled him to find 
practical solutions to specific needs, solutions that 
almost invariably were of necessity a compromise between 
the ideal and the practicable. 
Of all the influences during his formative years, 
his mother was the greatest. From her he gained his 
hatred d-r oppression and his support for Irish nationalism. 1 
1 Herald, 20 November 1930; Lyons, p.45. 
Distrusting England, he was a strong Australian 
nationalist. 1 The economic control exercised by the 
England-based Van Dieman 1 s Land Company over a large 
section of the north-west coast led to his demands for 
the dissolution of big estates and monopolies, 
2 
especially those with absentee owners. His teaching 
6 
experience made him anxious so to improve the backward 
education system that all children could develop their 
talents to the full.3 From his early experience and 
observation of the poverty and injustices existing in 
Tasmanian society came his support for Labour's 
industrial policies and for the development of social 
services, including a state-controlled medical scheme, 
and for an expansion of government assistance to primary 
producers. 4 
Besides these reformist views on specific problems, 
his contact with Hobart Labour members stimulated his 
interest in more specifically theoretical questions. 
Expressing his instincts in the terminology of current 
political discussion, by 1909 he was describing himself 
as a 1 socialist 1 .5 His understanding of socialism was 
1 See Clipper, L~ September 1909, p.6. 
2 North-Western Advocate .and the Emu Bay Times, 8 October 
1908, p.2, and 10 October 1908, p.2; Daily Telegraph, 
24 March 1909; Clipper, 3 July 1909, p.5. 
J Lyons, p.84; Daily Post, 19 
17 April 1911, p.3, and 9 April 
1919, p.3. 
November 1910, p.11, 
1 914, p. 8; World, 6 May 
4 Daily Post, 28 March 1910, p.J, and 1 July 1912, p.3. 
5 Information given by Dame Enid Lyons; Clipper, 26 
June 1909, p.7. 
unclear, being apparently a confused combination of 
republicanism, vague utopianism, support for limited 
nationalization, and a conviction that the workers 
should be better treated; he never revealed any 
understanding of or sympathy for Marxist theory. He 
opposed direct action that bypassed parliamentary 
methods, insisting that reform of the existing social 
structure could be achieved by constitutional means. 1 
Whatever he may have called himself, his fundamental 
concern was with immediately practicable social welfare 
policies, not long-term panaceas. The Tasmanian Labour 
Party, reformist and undoctrinal, was the obvious party 
for him, and he had a feeling of' 'complete identity' 
with its views, 2 al though probably even in his earliest 
enthusiasm he did not believe that it had the exclusive 
possession of' political wisdom and virtue. 
7 
Having espoused the Labour cause, he sought to 
strengthen the party, and had no sympathy for half-
hearted menfuers. At his first W.P.L. Conference, he 
described the whole Labour platform as 1 inviolate 1 , and 
strongly supported the institution of a strict pledge 
that parliamentarians must obey Caucus decisions. 3 He 
warned against Labour's being controlled by politicians, 
and in 1917 said that he was willing to place his 
resignation from parliament in the hands of the executive, 
to be invoked if he ceased to represent Labour views. 4 
Examiner, 9 JuLy 1921, p •. 5; World, 28 July 1921, p•6, 
and 5 May 1922, p.7. 
2 Lyons, p.174. 
3 Clipper, 12 June 1909, p.6. 
Daily Post, 19 June 1913, p.6, and 12 April 1917, p.3. 
j' ' . 
In 1921, he said that the workers should frame Labour 
policy and give the politicians definite instructions 
8 
on how to vote in parliament. 1 However, in the twenties 
he lost his enthusiasm for being guided by the executive 
and 1 the workers 1 • 
Though a deeply religious man all his life, his 
Catholicism does not appear greatly to have influenced 
his views on particular political issues, although its 
teaching supported his humanitarianism and desire to 
help the under-privileged. He probably knew little of 
the Church's detailed social teachings; the Tasmanian 
Church was too busy serving the spiritual needs of its 
flock to devote much time to propagating Catholic social 
doctrine. The Church 1 s main concern in politics was 
obtaining State Aid for its schools, a policy he 
2 
opposed, partly because of his years as pupil and 
teacher in the state system. He supported the Church's 
practical help for the poor, and was an honorary member 
of the Launceston St Vincent de Paul Society almost from 
its foundation.J 
In parliament, he at first took little part in 
proceedings, being, as he said, 1 glued to his seat 1 • 4 
However, he soon overcame his shyness, and began to 
attract attention with careful speeches on his chief 
1 World, 3 September 1921, p.5. 
2 Worlg, 29 May 1919, p.8. 
J J.V. Sullivan to J.A. Lyons, 25 October 1929, Lyons 
Papers, file 2. 
4 Matt O'Brien, writing in Advocate, 27 December 1931. 
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interest, social questions. He claimed to repres~nt the 
teachers in parliament, 1 arid sponsored legislation on 
education and health services. With his energy, 
education, and debating ability stemming from his years 
as a teacher and organizer of debating societies, he 
soon became prominent among the Labour members, few of 
whom could match his intellectual and political talents. 
The inadequacy of his fellow members was an important 
reason for his dominance over the party from 1917 to 
1929. His increasing popularity was revealed in the 1912 
election, when he easily headed the Wilmot poll. 
While becoming prominent in parliament, he also 
gained high positions in the party over men who had 
given longer service, but had less ability. At the 1911 
Conference he was elected to the executive, and at the 
1912 Conference came 'the proudest moment of his life', 
with his election as President of the W.P.L. 2 After 
1912, he was elected to any executive position for which 
he stood. In January 1914, at the age of 34, he was 
elected Deputy Leader of the parliamentary party. 
In April 1914, the first effective Labour Government 
was formed, with John Earle as Premier; his previous 
government, in 1909, had survived for only six days. The 
government was in a minority, depending on the erratic 
support of' a Liberal rebel in the Lowel.' House, and being 
without representation in the unsympathetic Upper House. 
Because of these circumstances, coupled with the outbreak 
1 Mercury, 9 July 1909, p.6. 
2 Daily Post, 1 July 1912, p.3. 
s 
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of war, which limited the government's financial freedom, 
and the inexperience of the Ministry, Labour in office 
was not as effective a reforming force as its supporters 
had hoped. However, it did show the conservative 
Tasmanian electorate that Labour was a safe alternative 
government. 
Lyons was appointed Treasurer, Minister for 
Education, and Minister for Railways. The first teacher 
to become Minister for Education, his experience enabled 
him to propose detailed plans for improving state 
education. 1 He expanded and improved the system, helping 
country children in particular, developing secondary and 
technical education and teacher training, and expanding 
medical benefits for school children. But his long-held 
desire to provide equal pay :for women teachers was 
rejected by the Legislative Council. 2 As Minister for 
Railways, he was a sympathetic administrator of' his 
employees, but was prevented by lack of funds from 
granting all the pay increases requested. A private 
line was nationalized.3 
1 See Daily_,Post, 16 April 1914, p.7. 
2 See Daily~' 15 February ·1916, p.7; Tasmania, 
Ot'f'icial Publications, 191 l~-5, no. 23, Financial Statement 
of the Treasurer of Tasmania and Statement of the Minister 
for Railways and Minister for Education, 1914-15, pp.16-18; 
1915-6, no.4, Education Department: Report for 1914; 
1916-7, no.4, Education Department: Report for 1915. 
3 See Tasmania, Official Publications, 1914-5, no.23, .•• ; 
Daily Post, 1 July 1914, pp.5-6. 
11 
His main work was as Treasurer, and from this period 
economics became his chief interest. Of finance, unlike 
teaching, he had no direct experience, and therefore no 
detailed. plans to fulfil when becoming Treasurer. 
However, he was anxious to become competent in his new 
role, and. sought the guidance of L.F. Giblin, then a 
Labour parliamentarian as well as his friend and chief 
financial adviser. Lyons was handicapped by war-time 
financial stringency and the permanently indebted 
Tasmanian economy; one of his more radical plans to 
meet the problem, a moratorium on debts f'or the duration 
of the war, was defeated by Parliament. 1 In accordance 
with Labour policy, he transferred government banking 
business to the Commonwealth Bank. Cautious yet not 
unimaginative, he partly reorganized government finances, 
gave increased assistance to farmers, levied taxes more 
equitably, and aimed to limit government spending and to 
balance the budget. He relied considerably on :f'ederal 
. t 2 assis ance. 
In the April 1916 election, the Earle Government 
lost by two seats, although Labour f'or the first time 
gained a small majority of primary votes. The government 
had implemented such party policies as the nationalization 
of' the Hydro-Electric Company, an extension of the Wages 
Daily Post, 27 August 191l~, p.3. 
2 See Tasmania, Official Publications, 191 L~-5, no. 23, • .. ; 
1915-6, no.9, Royal Commission on the Public Debts Sinking 
Funds of' Tasmania: Report of' the Commissioners, with 
Evidence taken and other Documents; no.24, Financial 
Statement of the Treasurer of Tasmania, 1915-16; Daily 
~' 11 August 1916, p.7. 
12 ) 
Board system, and the regulation of hours and conditions 
for miners, but the Legislative Council had defeated a 
bill nationalizing the Latrobe shale oil works, and 
anoi:,her establishing a state-owned sawmill. Such 
legislative defeats, and Cabinet's caution and 
moderation, made some unionists dissatisfied with Labour's 
performance as a government, and especially with John 
Earle's leadership. 1 Lyons, however, emerged from the 
Earle Government with a heightened reputation as an able 
and liberal administrator and a compe'tent spokesman for 
the party. After having the guidance of Giblin and the 
experience of financial administration, he was now able 
to speak f'luently about :finance, and was better able to 
understand the practical needs of Tasmania. F'rom 1916 
'" onwards he was unrivalled as Labour 1 s financial expert, 
for Giblin had left parliament. These two years as 
Treasurer were crucial for his later worlc in Tasmanian 
and federal politics, for he continued the same procedures 
almost unchanged: cautious and practical, seeking 
orthodox solutions to specific problems, and distrusting 
hypothetical advice. He con-binued to rely on the advice 
of experts who were not too unorthodox. 
On 28 April 1 915, he married Enid Burnell. She 
soon became a prominent and controversial :figure in the 
party, being too individualistic ever completely to sink 
her independence in any organization. 2 Her detached and 
analytical interest in political theory was superior to 
her husband's, who from the beginning admired her 'mental 
1 Mercury, 8 April 1915, p.6; Daily Post, 12 January 
1917, p.J. 
2 See Lyons, p.17h. 
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grasp and keen intellect 11 and was greatly influenced by 
her advice. In 1918, when only twenty, she attended her 
first Tasmanian Labour Conference, and f'rom that date 
played an active role in party affairs. 
In 1916, the threat of' conscription temporarily 
ended the friction between the parliamentary party and 
the unions, and led to Lyons becoming party leader. 
Besides his Irish distrust f'or England and its policies, 
Lyons had a strong emotional repugnance to violence and 
war, once saying that he would leave the party if' Labour 
supported capital punishment. 2 He refused to participate 
in recruiting drives, commenting in 1919 that he had 
'never gone on the platform waving flags and trying to 
induce others to do what ht '1.ad not done himself' - he had 
too much decency f'or that', c_' ough he honoured the men 
who had gone to fight. J He arg·ued that not only was 
conscription unnecessary, but that nobody had the moral 
l~ 
rie-1'-4- to vote away another man's life. This view never 
l., and when Prime Minister he refused to reintroduce 
compulsory military training despite the imminence of war 
with Germany and Japan. Most party members, while 
supporting the war, opposed conscription: only two state 
and two f'ederal parliamentarians supported Hughes and 
conscription. One of these was Earle, still the party 
1 J.A. Lyons to E.M. Burnell, n.d. [early 1915], quoted 
in Lyons , p. 7 2 9 
3 
see also Lyons, p.53. World, 29 February 1924, p.8; 
Mercury, 29 April 1919, p.8. 
Daily Post, 19 November 1917, p.8. 
p, 
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leader. At first, in the hope of avoiding a split, the 
Tasmanian c~ucus decided that conscription should be 
treated as a non-party measure, and not till 6 October 
did Lyons reveal to an anti-conscription meeting that 
the parliamentary party was split on the issue. 1 Most 
of the rank and f'ile members supported Lyons and the 
majority of the parliamentary party, although some 
unions and :four party branches supported Hughes, 
including the Devonport branch, of which Lyons was 
President. 2 Lyons led a vigorous and often bitter 
~ campaign in northern Tasmania: he was nearly thrown 
from the Deloraine bridge by a hostile crowd. 3 In the 
referendum1 Tasmania recorded 48,493 votes for 
conscription, with J7gBJJ against. 
Earle was still leader of' the Labour Party when 
parliament r·esumed on 1 November, and he refused to 
resien, but his position was untenable. The unions 
demanded his deposition, a demand shared by Caucus, 
which declared all off'icial positions vacant. On 2 
November, Lyons, the most able contender, was elected 
leader. 4 The split, although inevitable by November, 
was generally regretted: the Labour newspaper thanked 
Earle for his earlier efforts, and welcomed Lyons as 
1 a man of' marked ability, a fine speaker, and a keen 
Dai 1 y EQ.§1 , 7 0 ct ob er 1 9 1 6 , p • 1 1 • 
See DaJJ.x Post. 11 .January 1917, p. 7. 
J Lyons, p.9h; Mercury, 10 April 1919, p.2. 
4 DaJ.1x._.fQ.§J:., 2 November ·1916, pp.li. and 7, '.3 November 
1916, pp.4 and 6, and 11 January 1917, p.7. 
,~' 
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debator 1 , who would continue 1 the fine traditions of his 
1 predecessor'. Earle and the other conscriptionists 
still remained members of the party, but Lyons argued 
, 
that they had automatically placed themselves outside 
the Labour movement, and he hoped that the next state 
2 
conference would expel them. They forestalled expulsion 
by resigning in January 1917. The conscriptionist 
branches were dissolved, and the reconstituted Devonport 
branch re-elected Lyons as its President.3 
In 1917, the bitter opposition to conscription in 
the Tasmanian party increased. At the December 1916 
Interstate Labour Conference, Tasmanian delegates had 
opposed compulsory military training for home defence, 
while at the Tasmanian state conference in January 1917 
a motion opposing conscription to defend Australia was 
defeated by only two votes, and another motion was 
carried that consc:t'iption could be imposed only a·fter 
all incomes above £JOO a year were oonscripted. 4 In 
March, Lyons was sent to help Labour against W.A. Holman 
in the New South Wales state election. Unionists and 
parliamentarians united to oppose the second conscription 
referendum, with Lyons leading another bitter campaign. 5 
Daily Post, 3 November 1916. p.4. 
2 Daily Post, 16 November 1916, p.5. 
3 Daily Post, 26 January 1917, p.6. 
l~ Daily Po.§.!, 7 December 1916. p.5, 9 December 1916, 
p.4, and 12 January 1917, p.J~ 
~ See Minutes of tho Central Executive oi' the Tasmanian 
Branch of' the Austr;;i.lian Labour Party, 19 November 1917; 
Daily Post, 19 November 1917, p.6. 
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Tasmania again supported conscription, but by a majority 
of only 379 votes. 
By late 1917, the Tasmanian Labour Party began 
openly to oppose the continuation of the war. As early 
as April 1917, Robert Cosgrove, a future Premier, had 
supported the proposal to hold an international 
conference of workers to stop the war, as did the state 
executive in October. 1 In February 1918, on Lyons' 
motion, the executive approved the Federal Labour Party's 
intention to send a delegate to the Stockholm Peace 
Conference. 2 The May 1918 Tasmanian Labour Conference 
adopted Mrs Lyons' motion that Australia would not 
participate in any war without a prior referendum, unless 
Australia was directly attacked.3 Lyons, representing 
the Tasmanian Labour Party at the Governor-General's 
Recruiting Conference in April 1918, was convinced by 
Hughes of the serious position on the Western Front, and 
returned to ~ell his party that he 'could see no reason' 
why Labour should not support voluntary enlistment, 
although he himself would not speak from the recruiting 
platform. At this conference, he opposed economic 
pressure placed on men to force them to enlist, and 
demanded that Hughes pledge not to introduce conscription. 
He strongly criticised Hughes' restrictions on personal 
Dailv Post, 13 April 1917, po3: Minutes of the Central 
Executive of the Tasmanian Branch of' the Australian Labour 
Party, 15 October 1917. 
2 Minutes of the Central Executive of the Tasmanian 
Branch of the Australian Labour Party, 5 February 1918. 
'3 Daily Po.§j_,, 10 May 1918~ p.7. 
freedom, especially his anti-Sinn. Fein regulations, 
which he regarded as an insult to the Irish. 1 
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Lyons' position in the Labour movement was 
strengthened by his vigorous leadership against 
conscription, but his party lost much electoral support 
because of its allegedly pro-German views. In northern 
Tasmania, a Reform Labour League was formed by 
conscriptionist Labour men, and the party lost further 
supporters by its popular identification with Bolshevism, 
Catholicism. and the disloyal Irish. The latter were a 
major issue after 1916: Lyons wanted immediate Home Rule 
for Ireland, and at public meetings attacked the 
1 incredible 1 British actions in Ireland. 2 In 1917, when 
some Labour parliamentarians resigned from the state 
house to contest, unsuccessfully, the federal election, 
they were defeated in by-elections to re-enter state 
parliament, and Labour's strength was reduced to only 
ten members. The party polled badly in the May 1919 
state election, winning thirteen out of the thirty seats in 
the Assembly; T,yons 1 own vote fell drastically. He 
blamed the Catholic Federation for being largely 
responsible for the defeat because of its incorrect 
claim t~at Labour had promised ~tate aid for Catholic 
schools.3 ... 
Daily:_Post, 9 May 1918, p.7~ and 1L~ May 1918, p.3. 
2 For example, !?..§!ily Post, 21 November 1916, p.7. 
3 J.A. Lyons. quoted in World. 29 May 1919, p.8, and 2 
June 1919" p,6. 
There was some critic ism of' Lyons by Labour 1 s 
newspaper after this defeat~ 1 and disunity appeared 
amongst the parliamentary party along with doubts of 
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its ability to win an election. Lyons, whose ambitions 
had only limited outlets in Tasmania, stood for the 
federal seat, of Darwin in December 1919, but was defeated 
by over 1,000 votes. At the first caucus meeting after 
his defeat, in August 1920, he was unanimously re-elected 
leader. Chastened by his rebuff, he devoted himself to 
reviving the party, leading vigorous attacks on government 
policy, especially financial, and with other 
parliamentarians began to revitalize the party branches. 
His doubts about Labour's electoral chances and a 
2 passing enthusiasm for Swiss constitutional procedures 
w~re revealed by his support for motions at the 1919 and 
1920 state conferences that the ministry should be 
elected from all parties. He said that while opposed to 
a coalition, he thought 9 for reasons that he did not 
reveal, that an elected ministry would enable the 
implementation of at least some Labour policy;3 
confe~en~e rejected both motions, and he lost interest 
in the idea of an elected ministry. 
His political belief's had mellowed with his experience 
of administration in the.Earle Government, although he 
had not lost his basic err1'~!'ional attachments, and the 
war and its af'termath had increased his belie:f in the 
World, 3 ,June 191 9, p. 4. 
2 Information given by Dame Enid Lyons. 
Worl~, 6 May 1919, p.3,,and 14 May 1920, p.2. 
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urgent need f'or reform. On local issues, he was now less 
antagonistic towards his political opponents, and by 1922 
was describing himself as a f'riend of' all the members of 
the Assembly and stating that a parliamentarian should 
leave politics if he could not fight for policies without 
1 becoming personal. As party leader, he was becoming 
increasingly aware of' the cautious tactics needed to 
attract the support of' the conservative Tasmanian. voters, 
who were easily alienated by postures of class militancy. 
As the industrial working-class was mainly confined to 
the Denison electorate, election-winning tactics and 
policies had to be broadly-based. He now strongly 
repudiated suggestions that Labour was a sectional party, 
and claimed that only his party would adequately develop 
Tasmania, encourage the growth of' industry, and build his 
vision of a 'big Tasmania'. 2 His mellowing coupled with 
his ability as party leader and as exponent of' practical 
suggestions to help Tasmania made him increasingly 
admired by his party and respected by the electors. 
At first conce.rned mainly with social and educational 
questions, and then after 1914 with f'inancial problems, 
af'ter 1916 he became more actively interested in 
industrial and union af'f'airs. His involvement was 
encouraged by his closer association with the unions 
during and af'ter the conscription campaign. His wife 
shared bis desire to regulate the industrial system in 
the interests of' the workers. and at the 1920 state i 
conf'erence she carried a motion that no company should be 
-------1 li.Qrld, 12 ,July 1922, p.2. 
2 Q.ill.Y.....£1.2.§ .. :b 12 April 1917. p.l~; World, 13 March 1922, 
p. Li. 
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permitted to have profits over fifteen per cent a year 
on nett paid-up capital. 1 At the 1921 conference, he 
proposed that any employer paying less than award rates 
2 
should be charged with larceny. Strongly supporting 
all motions for improved industrial conditions, he also 
advocated the establishment of a forty-four-hour week 
and a State Arbitration Court. He still supported the 
introduction of some nationalization and government 
enterprise, wanted to nationalise the liquor trade and 
all hospitals, and to build a state shipbuilding yard 
at Devonportv3 
The Tasmanian Labour movement was dissatisfied with 
the aftermath of the war, for the promised new world had 
failed to materialize. There was an emotional reaction 
against the social system which continued unchanged 
despite the wartime horrors. Tasmania was normally f rather isolated from the views of the mainland party, 
~ but after the war several versions of the new socialist ~' ~ ~· doctrines spread to the island. Lyons had always regarded 
himself as some kind of socialist, and had occasionally 
used radical-sounding phrases, such as his assertion in 
hiB Presidential Address to the 1913 state conference 
that the party could not claim to be successful until 
the present structure of society was 'overturned' and 
replaced with one which guaranteed the worker the full 
}iorld, 14 May 1920, po2o 
2 Worl.Q., 7 July 1 921 ' p.6. 
3 Daily: Post, 17 August 1917, p.7; · World, 6 May 1 91 9' 
p.J, and 5 August 1920' p.6. 
value of his labours. 1 Caught up in the emotional 
reaction to the war, he was carried along with most of 
21 
the party in enthusiasm for the new ideal, Socialism, 
which held the promise of a new and better world. His 
critical faculty was not entirely suspended, as for all 
his talk of overturning social systems he opposed 
revolutionary methods, but he did not understand the 
full implications of his support for the new doctrine 
until 1922. Then, the approach of a state election forced 
him to be pragmatic, and he realized that 'socialism' to 
him meant something quite different from that understood 
by its Marxist advocates. His brief flirtation with 
socialism in 1921 was the last time he was carried away 
by enthusiasm for vague panaceas; after 1922 he was 
immersed in practical political and administrative 
questions, and had no time for and less interest in 
theoretical objectives. Until his change of mind in 
that year, his actions suggest not a cynical politician 
taking the expedient course, but an emotional enthusiast 
who had earlier embraced the wli.ole of' the 1 inviolate 1 
Labour platform and had wanted his parliamentary actions 
to be controlled by 'the workers' and the executive. 
Part of' his enthusiasm for a socialist objective 
arose from his search for a stronger, more integrated 
party organization to replace the disorganized base 
provided for the parliamentary party by the unions and 
party branches. He believed that an organization on 
the lines of the One Big Union could provide the necessary 
strong union base, although he disapproved of the anti-
Daily Post, 19 June 1913, p.5. 
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political views of' the mainland exponents of the One Big 
Union concept, probably not at first realizing that the 
basic reasoning behind the O.B.U. was anti-political. 1 
As part of his move to reorganize and strengthen the 
movement, in November 1920 he obtained the approval of 
the Tasmanian Executive for the federal suggestion that 
an All-Australian Trades Union Congress formulate a more 
2 ~ radical industrial policy for Labour. He first revealed 
fully the apparent radicalism of' his thinking in March 
l 921 , when in an address on the Hobart Domain he said 
that 'the capitalistic system has failed and the world 
is on the threshold of' a new social order'. He blamed 
the 'pernicious capitalistic system' for the war and its 
legacy o:f debt, unemployment and misery, and called :for 
a new Labour platf'orm and the union of the mcvement 1 s 
political and industrial wings. Though against 
revolutionary methods, he said that capitalism must be 
replaced: 'new methods must be devised for the new day 1 • 3 
This speech about an undefined 'new social order' 
was notable more for its imprecision than for its 
radicalism. It implied no more than a moral, social, 
and economic reshaping of society at some future date 
by constitutional action; he did not reveal any precise 
understanding of ·the nature of a socialist society. 
Throughout 1921, he aclvor.ated this cloudy vision of 
better things to come, and at the July state conference 
World,, 3 May 1919, p.7, and 6 May 1919, p.3. 
2 Minutes of the Central Executive of the Tasmanian 
Branch of' the Australian Labour Party, h November 1920. 
3 World, 14 March 1921, p.4; see also Worl~, 6 July 
1921, p.6. 
seconded the motion that Tasmania's delegates to the 
federal conference at Brisbane be pledged to support 
the One Big TJnion and the Socialization Objective. 1 
A final decision~as deferred for a special conference 
23 
in September. When cri.ticized for supporting revolution, 
he attempted~ unsuccessfully, to clarify his position by 
explaining that he f'avoured 1 revolution indeed, but 
revolution by peaceful means' and constitutional action. 2 
After the July conference, he began to realize that 
by his loose talk of revolution he was not only implying 
more than intended, but that he also was alienating the 
, electorate. At the September conference, therefore, his 
wife attempted to remove the word 'revolutionary' from 
r 
I 
I f 
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the clause which called on the workers to 1 take and hold 
by revolutionary industrial and political action the 
means of' production, distribution, and exchange 1 • In the 
ensuing discussion, Lyons explained that while he supported 
this principle, he wished Conference to accept his wife's 
amendment as 1 compromising on words, but not on principles 1 • 
Their wishes were ignored, and the delegates to Brisbane 
were pledged to support the full O.B.U. Preamble and the 
Socialization Objective.3 Lyons was a delegate, but could 
not attend for financial reasons. 
Tlw approach of the state election of' June 1 922 
brought the politicians back to political reality. The 
Tasmanian electorate did not understand nor would it 
World, 6 July 1921, p.6. 
2 Examiner, 9 July 1921, p.5; World, 28 July 1921, p.6. 
3 World, J September 1921, p.5. 
accept a socialist policy, and unionists had shown almost 
. total apathy towards the One Big Unio:n. 1 Some Labour 
politicians had opposed the adoption o:f the socialist 
objective, and most had no clearer understanding o:f 
socialism than Lyons. In December 1921, the Divisional 
Council in Denison, the most urbanized and industrialized 
electorate, proposed that all candidates in 1922 should 
support the new Objective, although it was not yet 
of':ficially adopted 1n Tasmania. However, at an executive 
meeting in January 1922, Lyons and his Deputy Leader, 
another strong supporter of' the new Objective in 1921, 
carried a resolution that candidates be pledged to the 
2 
old objective alone. By delaying Conference until a:fter 
the election, they prevented the 1 Red 1 Objective being 
adopted be:fore polling day. The majority of' executive 
members at that time were parliamentarians. 
Lyons' policy speech, unanimously endorsed by all 
Labour candidates, rejected as 'absolutely untrue' the 
charge that the Tasmanian Labour Party supported the One 
Big Union. Insisting that he wanted society reformed by 
constitutional means alone, he promised to leave the 
party should it ever use unconstitutional methods.3 
These evasions about the impl:Lcations of' the new platform 
did not convince his opponents, and angered the more 
radical of' his :followers: Dwyer Gray, a future Premier, 
castigated him as 'the greatest traitor to the trade 
See editorial in }[orl.9., 19 July 1922, p.h. 
2 Minutes of' the Central Executive of' the Tasmanian 
Branch o:f the Australian Labour Party, 30 January 1922. 
3 Wor \d, 5 May 1922, p • 7. 
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union movement in Tasmania'. 1 In the election, only one 
comparatively radical candidate was elected, and the 
leading Labour moderate topped the ballot in his 
electorate; Labour lost one seat, leaving it with only 
twelve out o:f thirty. 
The July 1922 state conference adopted the new 
Objective, but carried Lyons' amendment rejecting two 
of' the Methods for its implementation, namely the 
formation of a Supreme Economic Council and the training 
of workers to manage nationalized industries. Also on 
his motion, conference adopted the 'Blackburn Interpretation', 
which specified that as Labour mainly opposed exploitation, 
it would not abolish private ownership that was conducted 
1 in a socially use:ful manner and without exploitation' • 2 
As tbe Brisbane conferBnce had transformed the 'socialist 
tiger into a sacred cowl by refusing to make socialism 
Labour's fighting platform, designating it as merely a 
pious objective,3 Lyons could safely support socialism, 
keeping it :firmly in the background while :fighting 
elections on the practical needs o:f Tasmania. Little 
was heard o:f socialism in Tasmania after 1922; the 
party's final divorce from the theorizing of 1921 came 
in October 1923, when Lyons unexpectedly formed a 
govermnen to 
ligti,9.,, l July 1922. p.h. 
2 Australian Labour Party, Tasmanian Branch: Minutes of' 
Annual State Conference, 1922. 
'.3 Ian Turner, Indust_tial Labour and Politics: T.h.g_ 
Dynamics of' the Labour Movement in Eastern Australia, 
J..2QQ..-1921 (canberr;-:-1965) 1 pp.225-6. 
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After the 1?22 election, the Nationalist government 
became disunited and its followers increasingly dissatisfied 
with its mediocre performance. Unable to handle the 
worsening economy, the government was politically 
handicapped by the election of five Country Party members 
in 1922. This party, representing conservative landed 
interests, forced the resignation of the unpopular Sir 
Walter Lee as Premier, but his replacement was no more 
successful, and in August 19.;-;3 Lee again became Premier. 
Lyon!!> vigorously and effectively attaclced the government's 
clumsy financial measures, which he claimed were bank-
rupting the state, ·i and disaffected government supporters 
began to consider supporting a Lyons Government in a 
last effort to salvage the economy. On 23 October 1923, 
two Nationalists, the leader of the Country Party, and 
an Independent Labonr member voted with the Opposition 
to defeat the budget, and Lyons was asked to form a 
governmento Several Nationalists assured him of 
support on condition that his government limited its 
work to tack.ling the financial crisis and did not 
introduce legislation unacceptable to them. The new 
government was immediately challenged by a motion of 
no-confidence, but more rebels decided to support Lyons, 
who won by nineteen votes to eight. The Nationalist 
Speaker also supported the new administration. Lyons' 
friendship with his opponents, his parliamentary ability, 
and his well-prepared and aggressively pro-Tasmanian 
policies, combined with Nationalist misgovernment, had 
See World, 26 October 1922, p.7, 23 March 1923, p.4, 
27 March-i 923, p.), 28 March 1 9231 p. 7, and 28 June 1 923, 
p.2. 
27 
caused a political reversal o:f fortune unique in Tasmanian 
history. 
Lyons was in a difficult position as Premier. 
Politically, he was entirely dependent on the uncertain 
good-will o:f the Nationalist rebels, who would desert him 
as they had deserted their own leaders if he failed to 
diminish the state 1 s immediate financial problems. The 
Legislative Council was antagonistic, and did not contain 
a single Labour representative. Yet he had to implement 
some Labour policies to satisfy his own party. The 
financial position was serious, the state debt having 
increased by 65 per cent since 191 l~ compared to a 
population growth o:f six and a half per cent. Business 
was stagnant, the accumulated de:fici t totalled £600, 000, 
and half the government's revenue was earmarked for 
interest payments, c.ll though no payment of British interest 
debts had been made since March 1922. In desperation, 
the Nationalist Government had overspent without 
parliamentary approval and was planning to increase 
taxes, reduce public service salaries by from ten to 
eighteen per cent, end free education, and revoke op 
restrict some social services. 1 Before taking of'f'iL;e, 
Lyons warned his supporters that almost his whole 
attention would have to be devoted to repairing the 
:financ0s, and that it would be financially impossible to 
f'ulf'il the Labour platf'orm. 2 Exasperation with the 
previous administration coupled with Lyons 1 able speeches 
World, 28 June 1923, p.2, 22 October 1923, p.h, and 
25 October 1923. p.). 
2 World, 22 October 1923, p.3. 
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on the :financial crisis meant that he entered office with 
a cert.,.1,n amount of public goodwill; the conservative 
Mercury, which earlier would have regarded a Lyons 
Government as the first step to 'Red Ruin', now insisted 
that he must be given a fair chance, and found it 
1 refreshj.ng' to have a Premier 'ready to listen to a 
suggestion and promise to give it something like 
sympathetic consideration'. 1 
This willingness to take advice characterized Lyons' 
Premiership. Treasurer as well as Premier, he sought 
advice from economists and businessmen, irrespective of 
' 
their political allegiance, on ways to tackle the 
financial crisis. They gave him much valuable information 
and assistance, and these tactics created popular 
confidence in the government, dispelling the common view 
that Labour would govern in the interests of its 
supporters alone. He tried to reach agreement between 
the part.ies on legislation necessary for Tasmania 1 s 
economic advancement, even after the 1925 election had 
given him a majority in the Lower House. The Opposition 
in the Assembly gratefully re~ponded to his 'get together' 
attitude by judging policies more on their merits ~han 
from a party viewpoint. 2 Lyons conferred with relevant 
interest groups boforo introducing contentious legislation, 
hoping to reach a compromise acceptable to all concerned. 
Before the Workers' Compensation Bill was brought before 
parliament, a conference of employers, unions, and insurance 
companies unanimously approved the bill, after first making 
1 
2 
Mercury, 30 Octvber 1923 1 p.6, and 1 November 192.'.3, p.6. 
See J.C. McPhee, quoted in Mercury, .'.30 June 1928. 
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1 
some amendments. The introduction of the Workers 1 
(Occupational Diseases) Relief Fund Bill was preceded by 
conferences lasing for tw:o and a half years between the 
Mines and Metals Association, employers and unions, and 
2 
representatives of the Upper and Lower Houses. A genial 
leader of the House, Lyons tried to restrain disputes, 
and preferred to utilize his facility, derived from his 
teaching days, for painstaking exposition of policy to 
convince the Opposition rather than attempt to force 
legislation through parliament. Parliament under his 
guidance was a friendly body with little personal 
bitterness between members of opposing parties; when 
his presence was not needed in the House, he liked to 
yarn over a bottle o:f Scotch in the Spe<i.ker 1 s room with 
other parliamentarians, ready if necessary to intervene 
in the debates. 3 His years as Premier were the happiest 
and the most success:ful of his political career. 
As when Treasurer in the Earle Government, in the 
twenties he placed considerable reliance on the expert 
advice of economists at the University of Tasmania, h 
especially D.B. Copland, as well as on that of L.F. 
Giblin, since 1920 Deputy Commonwealth Statistician in 
Tasmania. Giblin played a major pa~t in preparing a 
series of Cases for increased help for Tasmania, with 
Mercury; 1 8 December 1 926, p. 8. 
2 Mercury;, 13 October 1925, p.9. 
3 A. J. Villiers, writing in N_ew York Herqld Tribune, 28 
February 19')2. 
h See T. Hytten, 1Giblin as an Economist', in D.E. 
Copland (ed.) , Gi b.lin - The §.£h.9.b'1:L.fillli....the Man (Melbourne, 
1960), p.15l~. 
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assistance :from J.B. ·Thridge~ of the Tasmanian University. 1 
A conscientious and hard-working administrator, Lyons, 
although without training in financial theory, was able 
to understand and to carry out the advice of his experts. 
Like his :fellow Tasmanians, Lyons considered that 
many of the state's basic financial disabilities were 
caused by federation, and therefore his main efforts as 
Treasurer were so to reorganize the state 1 s :finances 
that the Commonwealth would be satisfied that he was 
seriously attempting to revitalize the depressed economy, 
and accordingly deserved to receive increased :federal 
assistance. 2 Tasmania was dependent on :federal :finance 
:for development, for state revenue was so inadequate 
that on taking office Lyons was forced to use loan money 
to meet ordinary expenses and to pay o:f:f the state's 
deficits. As Tasmania had amongst the highest tax rates 
in Australia, he felt that any increase would intensify 
the loss of population to the mainland.3 Commonwealth 
assistance did increase after he led a deputation to the 
Commonwealth Treasurer, Tasmania in 192l~ being granted 
£250,000 to be spread over five years. At his request, 
the Commonwealth abandoned its tax on Tattersalls lottery, 
A.G. Ogilvie and Tasman Shields to J.A. Lyons, 23 March 
1926, Tasmania, Premier's Department, 25 Hay 1926; D.B. 
Copland to J.A. Lyons, 24 June 192lH L.F. Giblin to J.A. 
Lyons, 25 June 192L~, Treasury, General Correspondence 
Register, :file3211; World, 14Hay1924, p.6. 
2 J.A. Lyons, quoted in World, 23 January 1924, p.6. 
J Notes o:f Deputation led by J.A. Lyons to the Commonwealth 
Treasurer, Melbourne, 7 December 1923, Commonwealth, 
Treasury, 34/4450. 
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the taxing power being transferred to Tasmania; 
Tattersalls provided about one-tenth of Tasmania's total 
revenue in. the twenties, and in 1924 he accepted its 
gift of £10,000 for Tasmanian hospitals. 1 Taxation was 
reduced and more equitably imposed, loan expenditure 
reduced, all public service salary cuts restored, and 
the State Shipping Line, established with Labour's 
approval in 1920 to provide transport to the mainland, 
was hastily sold, as it had proved an expensive liability. 
Although expenditure increased, the state of the economy 
improved, and in 192.5 Lyons produced the first budgetary 
surplus for years. 
Besides salvaging the economy, he began vigorous 
moves to expand existing Tasmanian industries and to 
attract other enterprises to the state. The failure of 
the State Shipping Line had lessened his earlier 
enthusiasm for state-owned enterprises, and in any case 
the Legislative Council prevented any more being created; 
he now believed that the government's task was to provide 
the groundwork upon which private enterprise could 
2 develop the state. Immediately on becoming Premier, he 
established a State Development Advisory Board under his 
friend Selby Wilson, a moderate Labour member. This non-
political board was asked to produce schemes that would 
attract industries which would develop the state; its 
small central executive included leadine representatives 
World, 16 May 192l~, p.7. 
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o:f industry. 1 However, most attempts to introduce new 
industries :failed. 
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Lyons 1 strong lec:.dership, his success in improving 
Tasmania's :financial position, and his popularity with 
the electors gave Labour at the 1925 election its :first 
real chance to win a majority o:f seats. Even his more 
controversial actions, such as the appointment of an ex-
President o:f the British Trades Union Congress as Governor 
of Tasmania, were, after the initial surprise, accepted 
by most electors. His political strength in 1925 was 
increased by the complete disunity of the Opposition: 
most Opposition members praised his performance and 
criticized their own leaders. The Mercury commended 
his 'excellent work', which was 'convincing people that 
it was possible for-a Labour Premier to have qualities 
and ideas which would inspire con:fidence in the 
community'. 2 His policy speech dealt mainly with non-
partisan plans :for the development of Tasmania. 3 Although 
the press no longer distrusted him, it regarded other 
Labour men as dangerous radiculs: the Mercury tried to 
deter electors from voting Labour by suggesting that 
Caucus might not re-elect Lyons to the Ministry. L~ In a 
vigorous campaign, Lyons toured all Tasmania, and forced 
a public debate with the unwilling Opposition leader.5 
2 
3 
5 
World, 12 November 1923. 
Editorial in Mercury, 29 April 1925, p.6. 
Mercury, 29 April 1925, pp.7-8. 
Editorial in Mercur~, 27 May 1925, p.6. 
Mercury, 23 May 1925, p.13, and 26 May 1925, pp.7-8. 
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On polling day, J June, the Labour Party won sixteen seats, a 
gain of four; Lyons received 4,125 first preferences, 
the next candidate in his electorate receiving only 
1 1,511. 
Labour's first election victory was a personal 
triumph for Lyons and a vindication of his deliberately 
restricted role oi cautious innovator of small-scale, 
moderately liberal, and usually non~· partisan reforms. 
While privately he theorized about large-scale problems 
and their solution, as Premier he limited his policies 
to the particular and the practicable. Apart from his 
growing political caution, Tasmania's limited resources 
and depleted Treasury restricteq any adventurous 
programmes. Ria qualities and style of leadership were 
peculiarly suitable to his small, parochial state, and 
he was an excellent Premier. The period from 1923 to 
" 1928 was unequalled in his career for constructive and 
sometimes imaginative administration. Well and rightly 
satisfied with his competence to attempt Tasmania's 
financial reconstruction and economic development, he 
suffered little self-doubt about his leadership or his 
policies, although he remained constantly cautious for 
fear that he might make an unwise decision. For all his 
desire to have Opposition approval for his developmental 
policies, he was convinced that the Labour Party under 
hi$ guidance could best govern the state. He :felt 
especially competent as a political tactician, and was 
annoyed and even distressed at any criticisms of his 
1 Tasmania, Official Publications, 1926-7, no.4, Report 
on General Election, J June 1925 ••• , p.17. 
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leadership: he considered most criticism to be unfair., 
and developed a sensitivity to attack and a refusal to 
bow to pressure that partly explained his later actions 
in the Scullin Government. 
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By 1925, his style of leadership had been perfected, 
and changed little after his entry into federal politics. 
The main feature largely peculiar to his Tasmanian career 
was his dominant role in framing policy. In Tasmania, he 
originated most of the important policies which Cabinet 
adopted; although he never forced policy upon Cabinet, 
with which he worked amicably, the final decision was 
never contrary to his wishes, and was usually altered 
less by opposition within Cabinet than by financial 
considerations or such political handicaps as the 
intransigence of the Legislative Council. While leader, 
the choice of Labour's tactics in handling parliament 
and in seeking electoral support was his prerogative 
alone. As the personal relationships arising from 
political life were to him amongst its most rewarding 
and agreeable features, he sought to develop friendly 
relations with all his associates and even his opponents. 
In return, he was liked and admired by all except those 
ideologically antagonistic or those whose ambitions were 
hindered by his continued leadership; this friendly 
atmosphere assisted the working out of policy and its 
discussion by parliament. 
While quick to grasp the outline of a problem, he 
disliked haste in making important decisions or having 
to improvise: he liked to receive as much advice as 
possible from whoever was willing to give it, to have 
plenty of time for its consideration, to add his personal 
r 
I 
I 
l 
I 
I 
L 
35 
perspective to the ideas suggested, and to have room for 
political manoeuvering to counter any doubts amongst his 
party, the Opposition, businessmen, or the Legislative 
Council. He had understanding of and even insight into 
some problems, notably education and some rural affairs 
as a consequence of his early experiences. His sympathetic 
understanding of the workers and his experiences when a 
teacher in railway and mining towns made him conscious 
of the poor working conditions of the time, while from 
his discussions with Giblin and his experience as state 
Treasurer he became a competent and orthodox financial 
administrator. Sensitivity to the human difficulties 
involved in social and economic problems influenced most 
of his decisions; his supporters were not mistaken when 
they beli·eved that 1 Our Joe' understood and sympathized 
with their needs. However, ·when choosing specific 
policies he was influenced less by sentiment than by 
facts and arguments. 
Of all his advisers, his wife had the greatest 
influence. On vacating office, he said that 'no Premier's 
wife had played a bigger part in the life of' a Premier' , 
explaining that 1 her brilliant intellect, combined with 
the natural sagacity of her sex', had helped him to work 
out his problems; 
f . 1 d . . 1 1na ecisions. 
he often consulted her before making 
With his encouragement, both Mrs Lyons 
and her mother stood for election as Labour Party 
candidates in 1925. 
In his last six years in Tasmanian politics, he 
began to see himself' as being partly •above' politics, 
I 
I 
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and he deliberately developed a 'national', non-party 
stance on most issues. He avoided the cruder forms of 
political controversy, rarely descending to abusing an 
opponent. He invariably sought to unite all Tasmanian 
political and economic groups to assist particular 
schemes to develop the state. Immersed in administration, 
he had lost some of his earlier enthusiasms: no longer 
a republican, 'his early dreams of socialism were tempered 
now by awareness of the danger to individual freedom' 
which he now believed socialism contained. 1 While still 
believing as strongly as before in the need for 
humanitarian legislation, social equality, help for 
lower-paid workers, and equal opportunities for all, he 
had lost his feelings of class exclusiveness and had 
learnt to be patient in trying to reform society; the 
moderating of some of his old enthusiasms made it easier 
for him to see himself as a 'national' rather than as a 
party figure. 
He had only limited ability as an orator, although 
this was a minor handicap in state politics. His speeches 
were plain and forthright, rarely of a kind that would 
excite an audience, yet they projected him as an ordinary 
,I 
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but attractive man, humble and sincere rather than brilliant, ~ 
and a competent leader with considerable understanding of 
Tasmania's problems. They were usually carefully expressed 
and factual, dealing with specific practical issues, and 
suggesting positive solutions where possible. Only on 
rare occasions, of which the conscription crisis was the 
most notable example, did he become the enthusiast and 
give emotional speeches that could excite a crowd. 
1 Lyons, p.1 L~5. 
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His non-partisan approach to Tasmania's financial 
needs, his willingness to listen to the opinions of' 
leading businessmen, and his success as Treasurer were 
applauded by the business community. In 1927, the 
retiring President of' the Hobart Chamber of' Commerce 
said that 'Tasmania never had had a man mor·e ready and 
more capable to work for his country's good, irrespective 
of party or of' party politics 1 • 1 By taking leading 
pressmen into his conf'idence, 2 he gained favourable 
coverage for Labour, and for himself' in particular, 
for the first time in the conservative Tasmanian press, 
Only critics on the left and right political fringes, 
who were jealous of' his success or had ideological 
reasons for disliking his policies, were dissatisfied 
with his Premiership.3 
Still Treasurer after the 1925 election, he continued 
his careful financial policy. The 1926 inquiry into 
Tasmania's disabilities under federation had the support 
of both parties, all business groups, and the press, and 
resulted in increased federal assistance: in 1927, 
£378, 000 was given as a special grant for two years in 
addition to the ordinary grant. Overseas interest debts 
• , 
werB reduced, and in 1927 Lyons was able to reduce taxation 'I 
and foreshadow further reductions. His handling of' the 
Treasury was so successf'ul that in 1928 the Commonweal th 
Mercury, 20 December 1927, p.8. 
2 See L. Broinowski to J .A. Lyons, 2L~ December 1931, 
Lyons Papers (c.A.), CP 103 (Series 19) Bundle 2 Folder B. 
3 See p.38 and pp.39-41. 
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reduced its special grant by £158,ooo. 1 The Carbide Works, 
taken under government control in 1923 as a result of their 
mismanagement1 was sold back to private enterprise in 
1927. Because of Tasmania's financial insecurity and 
lack of self-sufficiency, Lyons wanted an organized 
scheme for federal assistance to the states, and repeated 
his 191 L~ call for a Commonweal th Loan Council to control 
the raising of' state loans. He also supported the 
2 principle of uniform taxation levied by the Commonwealth. 
His insistence on morally-acceptable financial policies 
inspired his strong disapproval of local government 
bodies failing to meet interest and sinking fund payments, 
and of' the repudiation of pledges about the repayment of' 
loans.3 
For all his popularity and powers of' persuasion and 
conciliation, he had little inf~u~nce over the conservative 
Legislative Council, a qody he wanted to reform, or, 
l' 
preferably, to abolish. ~ Conferences with the Opposition 
in the Lower House overcame some of' its antipathy to his 
1 Tasmania, Official Publications, 1928-9, no.16, 
Financial Statement of' the Treasurer o:f Tasmania, 1928-29, 
p. 19. 
2 Tasmania, Official Publications, 191 L~-5, no. 23, 
Financial Statement of the Treasurer of' Tasmania ••. ; 
1923-4, no. 11, Financial Proposals submitted by the Pi.'ime 
Minister of Australia to the State Government ••. Report of' 
Joint Committee of' both Houses of Parliament, with Minutes 
of Proceedings and Appendix. 
3 Daily Post, 22 June 1917, p.3; Tasmania, Official 
Publications, 1926-7, no.5, Financial Statement of' the 
Treasurer of' Tasmania, 1926-7. 
4 J.A. Lyons, quoted in J[orld, 7 April 1923, p.7. 
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industrial legislation, but the Upper House either 
rejected such legislation or added unacceptable 
amendments. Attempts to broaden the Council's restricted 
franchise failed, and as it could not be dissolved it 
rejected or amended bills with impunity. In 1924 and 
1925, a seri.ous constitutional crisis was caused whe~ 
the Council amended two money bills: 161 items were 
altered in the 1924 Appropriation Bill •. When the Council 
refused to retract these amendments, Lyons ignored them, 
and obtained the Royal Assent to the bills in the form 
that they had left the Assembly. He was supported in 
this action not only by the law officers of tne Crown, 
but by the Administrator, who was also Chief Justice, and 
by the Governor. 1 However, counsel advising both the 
government and the Legislative Council regarded his 
actions as clearly unconstitutional, 2 and af·ber the 1925 
election he prepared to take the dispute to the Privy 
Council. Instead, a settlement was reached in 1926, 
Lyons compromising to avoid the invalidation of his 
1 Tasmania, Official Publications, 1924-5, no.41, Assent 
to Appropriation Bill, 1924-5 (no.67): Copies of Cables 
between His Excellency the Administrator of the Government 
and the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, &c.; no.45, Appropriation Bill, 1924-5 (no.67): 
Report of Select Committee, with Statement relative to 
Bill; Sir James 0 1 Grady to L.S. Ameryr 14 January 1925f 
Tasmania, Governor's Office, J4/1. 
2 Tasmania, Official Publications, 1928-9, no.21, Power 
of the Legislative Council to amend Money Bills: Case 
submitted by the Government in 1925 to Mr H.I. Cohen, 
K.C., and his Opinion thereon; 1929-JO, no.7, Power of 
the Legislative Council to amend Money Bills: Case 
submitted by the Tasmanian Farmers', Stockowners 1 and 
Orchardists 1 Association in 1925 to Sir Edward Mitchell, 
David Maughan, and J .H. Keating, and their Opinion thereon; 
but see H.V. Evatt, The King and His Dominion Governors 
(London, 1936), p.182. 
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Appropriation Acts that would follow an adverse Privy 
Council verdict. The compromise removed the Council's 
power to amend money bills, leaving it the right to 
reject them outright, if' it dared. 1 Parliament passed 
legislation validating the disputed acts. Soon 
discovering that he had gained very little from the 
L~O 
compromise, in the 
plans to introduce 
British Parliament 
1928 election oampaign Lyons announced 
legislation on the lines of' the 
Act of' 1911. 2 
Leading union of'f'icials had accepted the limitations 
imposed by Lyons' dependence upon Nationalist support 
prior to the 1925 election, bu~ thenceforth they :felt 
that he had no excuse f'or failing to implement 
exclusively 'Labour' policies, by which they meant their 
own industrial and socialist policies. Lacking his 
awareness that the party did not have the permanent 
support o:f a majority of' voters, they despised his 
unwillingness to alienate the new supporters whom Labour 
had attracted in 1925. The union leaders also tended to 
ignore such pra.ctical problems as the delicate state of' 
the Tasmanian economy and the obduracy o:f the Legislative 
Council. Lyons' industrial legislation dealt mainly with 
workers' compensation and the establishment o:f a State 
Arbitration Court, but, although in order not to alarm 
businessmen and the Council his bills were deliberately 
less extensive than the party and the unions would have 
1 Tasmania, Of'f'icial Publica·tions, 1925-6, no .15, Powers 
of' the Legislative Council with rega,rd to Money Bills: 
Report of' Joint Cammi ttee o:f both Ho~\ses of' Parliament, 
with Minutes of' Proceedings and Appendix. 
Mercury, 27 April 1928 1 p. 9 • 
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liked, even these first steps were rejected by the Upper 
House. Because of these parliamentary defeats, and the 
unlikelihood of the Council's changing its attitude, 
Lyons and other ministers supported the adoption of the 
1926 federal referendum, which proposed to increase 
ConunonweaJ;th powers over labour disputes; Lyons hoped 
that the Conunonwealth would do what the Council prevented 
his party from achieving. However, the voters rejected 
the referendum, and he was brought into conflict with 
Tasmanian unionism, which opposed the granting of 
1 
additional powers to the Bruce-Page Government. 
Despite considerable pressure from the unions, he 
refused to legislate for preference :for unionists, which 
he regarded as the granting of special privileges to one 
t . f th . t 2 1 h d . d f sec· ion o e commun:i. y; iowever, e :i. en- orce 
preference in government contracts. Although he had 
earlier supported the establishment of a l~4-hour week, 
he now refused to instittrte it, arguing that Tasmania's 
financial position permitted shorter working hours only 
if these were Australia-wide, and not restricted to 
Tasmania.J Hls refusal to accede to union requests was 
principally based not on the financial position nor on 
the obstructive Legislative Com1cil, but on his pledge 
l1 
not to deviate from his policy speech. Delivered at 
Voice o:f Labor, 5 June ·1926, p. 5, and 19 June 1 926, 
p.4; Labor Daily, 29 June 1926, p.6. 
2 See J.E. Ogden's speech in Commonwealt;h Parliamentary 
Debates (c.P.D.), vol.12l~, p.1709 (-14 May 1930). 
J J.A. Guy to C.E. Culley, 26 August 1926, Tasmania, 
Premier's Office, 84/20/26. 
4 Mercury, JO April 1925, p.9. 
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Deloraine, this had mentioned neither preference to 
unionists nor the 44-hour week. When rebuked in 1926 
l~2 
for using the Deloraine speech as a pretext for refusing 
union demands, 1 he replied that his speech was agreed to 
by all the Labour candidates, none of whom had requested 
the inclusion of either proposal. To ask the Legislative 
Council to approve the l~4-hour week was a waste of' time, 
and he refused to break faith with the electors by 
legislating for pref'erence to unionists. After stressing 
the need to win the confidence of the voters, he told a 
meeting of unionists that he would go to the electors on 
whatever planks of the platform they wished him to 
stress once he had carried out his Deloraine policy. 2 
Although he did not fulfil this promise, the Hobart 
Trades Hall decided not to harass him further; but it 
listed the industrial matters on which Labour should 
legislate if victorious in the 1928 election.J During 
the latter campaign, the Hobart Trades Hall Council openly 
e.xpressed dissa tisf'action with Lyons' performanc~ and its 
determination to ensure that the next Labour Government 
l~ 
was more in touch with union vie~s. It even asked all 
Labour candidates to pledge that they would not deviate 
from the platform in tlieir policy speeches, and would 
attempt to pass ·the whole platf'orm through parliament. 
However, no candidate signed this pledge, and an attempt 
1 For example, C.E. Culley to J.A. Lyons, 19 May 1926, 
Tasmania, Premier's Office, 84/10/26. 
2 Voice of Labor, 5 June 1926, p.5. 
Voice, 2h October 1931 1 p.6. 
Mercury, 6 June 1928, p.8. 
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to incorporate in Lyons 1 policy speech the explicit 
intention to fulfil all the Labour platform was voted 
down by a 'huge majority 1 of' the candidates. 1 In the 
election, an Industrial Labour candidate claiming to 
represent the unionists obtained the second highest 
primary vote in the Denison electorate. 
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A more personal dispute caused Lyons much unpleasant-
ness in 1927. Albert G. Ogilvie, Labour's able and 
ambitious Attorney-General and Minister for Education, 
had allied himself' with the more militant unionists 
against Lyons, in the hope of eventually supplanting him. 
However, little ill-will had developed between the two 
men until 1927, when Ogilvie was accused of corruption 
in his administration of' the Public Trust Office. 
Though the Royal Conunission into these charges found 
that one of Ogilvie 1 s legal partners was principally at 
f'aul t, Ogilvie was f'ound guilty of' some inef:f'iciency and 
lack of supervision. 2 OgiJ.vie reluctantly resigned f'rom 
Cabinet when Lyons insisted that he do so for the good of 
the party, and thereafter pursued him with unrelenting 
hatred; 1 the breach between tho two was never f'ully 
healed',3 Lyons retaliated in ldnd, and when he lef't 
Tasmanian politics in 1 929 appointed Ben Wutkins as 
1 Voice, 2lf October 1931, p.6. 
2 Tasmania, Of'f'iciaJ. Publication~, 1927-Eli no.31 l Public 
Trust Of'f'ice: Report Of' Royal Co~nission appointed to 
inquire into the Administration of' the Public l'rust 
Off'ice by The Hon. A.G. Ogilvie, ICC., and by ·che Ptl.blic 
Trustee. 
3 Lyons, p.136. 
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Acting Leader: Ogilvie had to wait for caucus to meet 
before his ambition to be leader was attained. 
Whatever Ogilvie and disgruntled union officials 
thought of Lyons' policies and performance, 1 0ur Joe' 
was highly regarded by the overwhelming majority of his 
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own party, and by many outside it. The Mercury continually 
praised him, bein~ especially pleased that he disregarded 
the socialist elements in the Labour platform, and in 1928 
it asked him to stand for election as an Independent free 
from the restrictions of Labour membership: 'he is the one 
man in Tasmania, probably the one in Australia, who has a 
personality and an influence to be able to discard party 
lines' and go to the electors with a call for them to 
follow him. 1 Mainland Labour members became aware of his 
.5uccess, and in 1925 E.G. Theodore told a Hobart meeting 
that he, like other Labour leaders, had been impressed 
with his 1 earnestness, his sincerity, his tenaci}:;y, and 
2 his courage'. Party members recognized the political 
success of his moderate policy, and at the 1926 and 1927 
State Conferences one-time supporters of the socialist 
Objective almost obtained the two-thirds majority vote 
that was necessary to replace it with the previous Objective. 3 
By the 1928 election, Lyons had a satisfying record 
of achievement: the financial position had greatly improved, 
industry was expanding, and agriculture was being aided 
through the reorganized Agricultural Department. Judging 
by its record and Lyons' prestige, the eovernment; had 
1 Mercury, 11 February 1928, p.8 
2 Mercury, 22 May 1925, pp.7-8, 
3 Australian Labot1r Party, Tasmanian Branch: Minutes of 
Annual State Conference, 1926 and ·1927. 
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good prospects of' being returned. However, the Opposition 
Nationalist Party, now reunited under the leadership of 
J.C. McPhee, was a f'ar more potent threat than in 1925. 
Labour was handicapped by the Ogilvie scandal, and by the 
outspoken expressions of' class militancy made by some 
Hobart union o:ff'icials. On the other hand, the Mercury, 
as L.F. Giblin noted, 1made no :fight at all and practically 
said: "We can 1 t tell you to vote for Lyons, but you 
won 1 t be f'ar wrong if' you do . But don't overdo it" ' . 1 
It advised electors to vote according to the merits of' 
the candidates, not according to parties, 2 and advised 
Lyons to stand as an Independent and form a coalition 
government; however, as some Nationalists complained, 
this was not even remotely possible.3 
With a publicly united party behind him, Lyons 
sought to attract the hesitant voter by his progressive 
policies and non-controversial stance. His moderate 
Labour friend Selby Wilson presided at the delivery of 
his policy speech, and Colonel A. C. Blacklow, who was 
not a member o:f the Labour Party and in 1929 was Nationalist 
candidate f'or ·bhe :federal Franklin seat, proposed the 
vote of' thanks. His policy, quite advanced :for Tasmania, 
included the establishment o:f a State Arbitration Court 
and Conciliation Commissioners, widows 1 pensions, 
unemployment insurance, an emphasis on :further economic 
development, a Conunonweal th Shipping Line to the mainland, 
L. F. Giblin to Ella Giblin, 10 June 1928, Giblin Papers. 
2 Mercury, 27 April 1928, p.6. 
J For example, Sir John Evans, quoted in Mercury, 1 May 
1928, p.5. 
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and an expanded franchise and improved deadlock provisions 
for the Legislative Council. 1 Perhaps he emphasized his 
moderation too emphatically, as for example when he 
declared that he had 'the finest personal feeling towards 
my opponents, and particularly towards the Leader of the 
Opposition 1 , whom he thanked for helping in the development 
of the state; 2 s~ch effusions may have caused some doubtful 
voters to play safe by voting for McPhee. 
Lyons was confideni{ of victory, 3 but although his 
party gained a majority·of almqst one thousand primary 
votes, it received only fourteen seats to the Nationalists' 
sixteen. Ogilvie was triumphantly re-elected in Franklin 
w:t.th 4, 570 primary votes, but the third Labour candidate 
was defeated in this electorate, while in Denison Labour's 
fourth seat was probably lost because of the disunity 
caused by an Industrial Labour candidate. This result 
was far worse than expected: fifteen-all had been the 
gloomiest forecast. B.J. Pearsall, an Independent, had 
stated when unsuccessfully contesting the 1925 election 
. l~ 
that he would keep a minority Lyons Government in power, 
and on being elected in 1928 told McPhee that he was 
prepared to support a Lyons Coali.tion Government. McPhee 
replied that he woulq participate if Lyons would, but 
Lyons refused to be tempted. 5 On leaving of:fice, Lyons 
2 
3 
5 
Mercury, 27 April 1928, pp.7 ann 9° 
Ibid., Mercury, 8 May 1928,, p.7. 
Mercury, 30 .May 1928, p.9; 
Mercury, 8 May 1925, p.8. 
Mercury, 1 3 June 1 9 28, p. 1 0. 
Lyons , p. 11~2. 
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promised McPhee the 'utmost support'; in response, 
McPhee described him as Tasmania's 'outstanding statesman', 
and thanked him 'from the bottom of my heart' for making 
many opportllllities available to discuss the state's 
problems, which had made him more fitted to take over as· 
P . 1 remier. 
The twelve months following this defeat were for 
Lyons and his wife 1 the golden year r , when they 1 knew 
~deep contentment, loving the tranquil pattern of our 
~· 
lives•. 2 He rested at Devonport with no political 
problems apart from the increasing discontent of Ogilvie 
and his small band of supporters. After the 1928 defeat, 
he was more vulnerable to Ogilvie 1 s sub.tle manoeuverings, 
manoeuverings that distressed him, and made him glad to 
leave Tasmanian politics in 1929. 3 However, while he 
remained leader, his position in the party was too strong 
:for Ogilvie to endanger immediately, :for he was still at 
the peak o:f his popularity, while Ogilvie was :far too 
unpopular to gain the support of a majority of party 
members. As the Labour yoice complained in 1931, he had 
been deified a:fter winning the 1925 election, and 'the 
deluded workers applauded his every utterance and his 
l~ 
every appearance :for long years•. 
Mercury, 16 June 1928, p.9. 
2 Lyons, p.146. 
3 Information given by Dame Enid Lyons; see J.P. Piggott 
to J.A. Lyons, 30 October 1929, Lyons Papers, :file 3. 
Voice, 17 October 1931, p.1. 
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However, f'or all his prestige and popularity, if' he 
had remained in Tasmanian politics he would have been in 
the same position as E.J. Hogan and L.L. Hill, Labour 
Premiers of' Victoria and South Australia respectively 
during the early part of' the Depression. Like them, he 
would have been f'aced with a party becoming frustrated 
by its dif'f'iculties and searching f'or radical solutions 
to the worsening Depression, and less inclined to heed 
calls f'or moderation. Under Ogilvie's guidance, the 
Tasmanian Labour Party in the early thirties supported 
Lang Labour against Scullin Labour; Lyons, however, 
would have supported not only Scullin Labour but also 
the Premier's Plan of' wage, pension, and interest cuts. 
His stand would have been completely at variance with 
popular feeling in the party, and under Ogilvie 1 s 
prompting his expubion could hardly have been avoided. 
He did not change his financial or political views on 
entering federal politics, and the only change that 
entering Scullin Government made was that instead of 
becoming a possible 1national 1 Premier he became a 
'national 1 Prime Minister. Whether in Tasmanian or 
federal politics, he could not have remained in the 
party once the proposals of' Theodore became official 
Labour policy. 
All his Tasmanian career pointed to th~) inev·i tabili ty 
of' a split with his party once the Depression bega~~, but 
he was as unaware o.f this when contemplating entering 
federal politics in 1929 as he was unaware of the extent 
of' the oncoming Depression.itself'. He had always been 
ambitious, and having held ·the highest position in 
Tasmania, he considered moving into a larger sphere. 
f 
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Perhaps he had learnt caution from his abortive 1919 
attempt, for in spite of much encouragement he did not 
contest the 1928 federal elections, using personal 
49 
h . 1 reasons as is excuse. However, the sudden fall of the 
Bruce-Page Government in 1929 created a better opportunity, 
and his interest in standing was encouraged by a telegram 
from J.H. Scullin, leader of the federal Labour Party, 
asking him to contest Wilmot, 2 a seat never yet won by 
Labour. His friend and former Deputy Premier Allan Guy 
was asked to stand for Bass. 
Lyons' vigorous campaign for election was based on 
the argument that if elected he could carry Tasmania's 
fight into the federal parliament: 'that is the vital 
question at issue' .3 S.M. Bruce, after describing him 
as 'a man entitled to a great amount of' respect' , warned 
that in federal parliament he would be controlled by 
'extremists'; Lyons replied that all Labour candidates 
were pledged to support Scullin' s policy speech, and he 
'would rather resign than be dictated to outside that 
settled policy•. 4 He strongly supported Scullin, 'the 
greatest Labour leader Australia had ever had' . 5 
1 Frank Brennan's speech in C.P.D., vol.128, p.242 
(13 March 1931); J.A. Lyons, reported in Mercury, 3 
December 1928, p.6. 
2 Lyons, p.148; J.A. Lyons' speech in C.P.D., vol.128, 
p.230 (13 March 1931). 
J J .. A. Lyons, quoted in Mercury, 26 September 1929, p. 11 . 
4 Mercury, 2 October 1929, p.9, and 4 October ·1929, p.10. 
5 Mercury, 11 October 1929, p.9. 
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Lyons easily won the Wilmot seat, and at his first 
federal caucus meeting was elected to Cabinet and 
appointed Postmaster-General and Minister for Works and 
Railways; as a tribute to his Tasmanian reputation, 
Scullin made him fifth in Cabinet seniority. He was 
allotted these federal posts because of' his long experience 
of' financial administration as Tasmanian Treasurer; 
although unspectacular, his new portfolios involved 
much administration and the handling of a large proportion 
of government spending. As he was the only member of' 
Scullin 1 s Cabinet besides Theodore with any administrative 
experience, he was appointed as Acting Treasurer when 
Theodore resigned in 19JO. With this rapid elevation 
into Federal Cabinet, he entered federal politics. 
Al though pl1aased with his success, he was somewhat wary 
of' his new party, of' which he knew little, for he 
realized that its methods would be more ruthless than in 
Tasmania, and was 'not quite sure how he would fit into 
the picture 1 • 1 
After a leading member was expelled from the 
Tasmanian Labour Party for disloyalty, Lyons in a bitter 
attack described as 1 a terrible thing' his selling of' 
his principles and the party that has li:fted him 
up. I hope that I will never have the misfortune 
to leave to my children the shame and the 
dishonoiLr of one who has become a traitor to his 
own cla~is ••• in order to serve the enemies of the 
people.~\ 
He did not and could not realize when making this speech 
that the groundwork had already been laid for his own 
1 Lyons , p. 1 L~9. 
2 Vo~ce 1 22 August 1931, p.1. 
. ! 
split with the party. His friendship with political 
opponents and businessmen, though normal in Tasmania, 
was rare in federal politics, where his desire to unite 
the various viewpoints into a 'national 1 policy was not 
only impractical but also was regarded as treachery to 
his party. He believed that to seel~ a united policy 
was feasible in federal politics, and during the 1926 
dispute about a possibl;e increase in Commonwealth power 
over arbitration he had advocated that the federal 
Nationalist and Labour leaders should jointly frame 
proposals which could be accepted by both parties. 1 
Through taking the advice of' economists and business-
men, he no longer thought that Labour's platform could 
solve all problems, nor believed in the party 'right 
or wrong' ; he supported the Labour Party because he 
always had, and his general idealistic beliefs were 
enshrined in its policies, but if the party should 
appear to reject these beliefs he would have no reason 
for following its dictates apart from traditional 
loyalty. 
51 
An orthodox Treasurer, he had concentrated on making 
Tasmania pay its way and meet all its debts, while 
avoiding extravagance and inflation: the federal party's 
refusal to follow this orthodox policy during a financial 
eris is was suffioien t to turn him against it. His 
insistence that Ogilvie resign to protect the party :from 
further scandal foreshadowed his stand over the Mungana 
allegations against Theodore. Having come to believe in 
strong leadership by Cabinet, he was not prepared to obey 
Argus, 16 June 1926, p.20. I I 
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Caucus decisions that he regarded as ill-informed and 
unwise. When the Depression led the federal and state 
Labour parties to adopt financial policies he could not 
accept, his split with the party was unavoidable; had 
there been no Depression, he could have remained a right-
wing member o.f the federal Labour Party to his death. 
One other important element that influenced him 
after leaving Tasmania was that economists and 
businessmen he had known. there were by 1930 connected 
with federal politics. While Premier, he had favourably 
impressed some mainland businessmen and newspaper men 
when attending Premiers' Conferences. 1 Amongst these 
was Colonel Harold Cohen, a Victorian M.L,C., who stated 
in 1931 that he had known Lyons 'for many years 1 ; 2 
Cohen was a leading member of the National Union, the 
Nationalists' main f'und-raising body. Another important 
contact was the Nettlefold f'runily of Tasmania: A.J. 
Nettlefold, manager of the Tasmanian Labour papers the 
Daily Post and its successor the World, had joined the 
Labour Party in October 1909, just after Lyons entered 
parliament. They became good friends,3 and Nettlef'old 1 s 
brother, T.S. Nettlefold, later Sir Thomas, was an 
important contact fo:t' Lyons in Melbourne in 1930. But 
the most impo:t<tant business :f'riend dating f'rom his 
Tasmanian days was Staniforth Ricketson, since 191 L~ the 
head of J. B, Were & • Son, the leading Melbourne investment 
house. 
1 L. Broinowski, writing in ~ing News, 17 February 1931. 
2 Argus, 19 March 1931. 
5 See A. J. Net;tlef'old to J .A. Lyons, 7 November 1930, 
Lyons Papers, f'ile J. 
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Ricketson became friendly with Lyons while a reporter 
on the Burnie Advocate from 1909 to 1911. Although 
Ricketson went to Melbourne in 1911, they kept in some 
contact through Herbert Richmond, who had worked on the 
North West Post at Latrobe when Ricketson was at Burnie. 
Also a friend of Lyons 1 , Richmond joined J.B. Were & Son 
in 192J. During the twenties, when Lyons was Treasurer, 
J.B. Were & Son sought to advise him on loan conditions 
and to arrange Tasmania 1 s overseas loans; however, he 
rejected each offer, having other :facilities. 1 Ricketson 
and Richmond applauded his 'ability and energy 1 as 
Premier, and were quick to congratulate him on becoming 
Postmaster-General in the Scullin Government. 2 When 
Ricketson and Lyons finally met again, in December 19JO, 
Lyons had defied Caucus and become a national figure, 
but, as his wife recalls, 1never again would we know 
peace' ,J 
1 J.B. Were & Son to J.A. Lyons, 5 December 1924; 
J .A. Lyons to J.B. Were & Son, 12 December 192L~, Tasmania, 
Treasury, General Correspondence Register, file Jl~87; 
J.B. Were & Son to J.A. Lyons, 4 July 1925; J.A. Lyo;ns to 
J.B. Were & Son, 6 July 1925, ibiq., file J5J7; J.B. 
Were & Son to J.A. Lyons, JO January 1926; J.A. Lyons to 
J.B. Were & Son, 1 February 1926, ibid., file J6JJ. 
2 J.B. Were & Son to J.A. Lyons, 2J October 1929, Lyons 
Papers, file 3. 
J Lyons, p.146. 
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Chapter 2 
THE SPLIT 
After the 1929 election, the Nationalist and Cowitry 
Part:ies were left with only twenty-four members in the 
House of Representatives; S.M. Bruce, Prime Minister 
until the election, had lost his seat, and five of his 
former supporters were returned as Independents owing no 
allegiance to J.G. Latham, the new Opposition leader. 
The new Labour government had forty-six members in the 
House. Bruce regarded this debacle as 'one of the most 
fortW1ate things that could possibly have happened to 
us 1 • Being more aware than the Labour Party of the 
probable extent of the growing economic crisis, he knew 
that the new government's unavoidably harsh steps to 
tackle the Depression would cause a strong swing back to 
the Nationalists, while the Labour ministers would 
'destroy themselves by their own actions and their own 
failures 1 • 1 
Frank Anstey, Labour's Minister for Health from 1929 
to March 1931, wrote in his memoirs that the Labour Party, 
on winning the election, found itself 'sitting on the eggs 
2 
of' the serpent'. With a serious .Depression beginning, 
'we had no power. From the first moment of our existence 
1 S.M. Bruce to G.F. Pearce, 27 May 1930, Pearce Papers, 
MS 1927 1 and 17 November 1929, Pearce Papers, MS 213 
2 Frank Anstey, Memoirs, 1The Viceroy', p.2. 
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1 
we were only the stuf'f'ed ef'f'igy of' a government'. With 
only seven members in a Senate of' thirty-six, the 
government's legislation could be def'eated at any time 
and it could not control the Commonwealth Bank or the 
Commonwealth Arbitration Court. The Loan Council was 
dominated by Nationalist and right-wing Labour governments. 
Labour lacked not only power, but also the unity and the 
considered and practicable f'inancial policies needed to 
tackle the Depression successf'ully. Scullin's 
overwhelming majority was a handica.1? rather than an 
asset, f'or it encouraged f'actionalism amongst ambitious 
backbenchers seeking Cabinet posts and also the f'ree 
expression of' personal antagonisms, antagonisms which 
were intensif'ied by dif'f'ering views of' what were suitable 
Depression policies. Scullin had to spend most of' his 
time trying to keep his party intact, leaving much of' 
the framing of' policy to his chief' lieutenant, E.G. 
Theodore. Some of' the new Labour parliamentarians, 
lacking political experience and without strong views 
of their own, allied themselves with each of the 
successively dominant personalities in Caucus. 2 Apart 
f'rom this vacillating group, a right-wing centred on 
Scullin, while most left-wing members f'rom New South Wales 
eventually formed a group under J.A. Beasley in support 
of J.T. Lang, the Labour leader in that state. 
1 Frank Anstey, Memoirs, 'The Transf'ormation', p.2. 
2 Perhaps ten were in this category: see Frank Anstey, 
Memoirs, •'rhe Transf'ormp.tion' 1 p.1, and Dr W. Maloney's 
speech in C.P.D., vol. 133, p.20 (17 February 1932). 
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Like the other parties, Labour did not understand the 
nature of iihe Depression, and had no agreed policy to 
combat it. The ~ight-wing favoured a conservative and 
orthodox policy, including wage and pension cuts, while 
the left-wing, rejecting any suggestion of' cuts, demanded 
that the fall in national income be offset by credit 
expansion. The views of' the left-wing were to dominate 
the government's policy discussions and to cause Lyons' 
split with the party, yet in spite of all the passion 
aroused, their proposals were politically, if not 
economically, irrelevant, because of' the government's 
minority in the Senate. However, most left-wing members, 
like their fellow Labour parliamentarians, refused to 
recognize that the government was powerless, and worked 
out a series of' policies quite unacceptable .to the Upper 
House. Labour's only method of gaining a majority in the 
Senate, and thereby possible control over the Commonwealth 
Bank, was by an early double-dissolution; but if this had 
been attempted, the government would probably have been 
defeated, for the onrush of the Dep~ession turned the 
electors against all governments. Scullin 1 s 'stuffed 
ef'f'igy' was in an impossible position, though not till mid-
19.31 did it acknowledge its powerlessness by adopting 
suitable policies, namely policies acceptable to the 
Senate. 
Faced with this confusion, Lyons quickly discovered 
that he was unable to adjust to the bitter factionalism 
and doctrinal controversies of federal caucus. As in 
Tasmania, he was personally popular and had good relations 
I 
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with Scullin and other leading ministers, 1 but he disliked 
.• the more ruthless polittcal climate and disagreed with 
many Caucus policy decisions and with the way these were 
implemented. Rath~r than openly criticize his new party, 
he deliberately played little. part in Caucus or Cabinet, 
preferring the relative obscurity of administering his 
2 departments. For the first nina months of the Scullin 
Government, he had little influence or prominence, apart 
from his special efforts to help Tasmania.3 Until 
becoming Acting Treasurer, he spoke in parliament on 
departmental rna tters alone, and spoke on federal 
assistance to Tasmania only after Latham criticized his 
silence. 4 Although he did not come into open conflict 
with Caucus until late in 1930, from the beginning his 
wife doubted·if he would long remain a member of the 
e::: 
federal party.:> 
Before being sworn in as Prime Minister, Scullin was 
given details of Australia's financial position by Sir 
Robert Gibson, Chairman of the Commonwealth Bank Board. 
1 
Warren Denning, Caucus Crisis (Sydney, 1937), pp.28-9. 
2 See J.A. Lyons' speech in C.P.D., vol. 128, p.230 and 
p.233 (13 March 1931); for his participation in Caucus 
discussion, see Minutes of the Federal Parliamentary Labor 
Party (caucus Minutes), 26 March 1930 and 26 June 1930. 
3 For example, roads: Mercury, 24 October 1929, p.14: 
shippin~: Caucus Minutes, 26 June 1930i C.P.D., vol. 129, 
p.1303 l24 April 1931). 
4 C.P.D., vol. 122, p.46,5 (28 November 1929) . 
.5 Lyons, p.174. 
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He was 'staggered' at the extent of the . . 1 crisis. Although 
Theodore, his Treasurer, made optimistic public statements, 
he told Cabinet that all Bruce's warnings of a crisis were 
2 
correct. Capital imports, which had averaga1£20,000,000 
a year since the war, had ceased completely, private 
capital was leaving the country, and export prices were 
.. 
falling drastically. It has been estimated that by June 
1931 the national income had fallen from £640,000,000 in 
1928-9 to £460,000,000,3 and by August 1931 export prices 
were only forty per cent of 1928 values. The end of 
capital inflow meant unemployment for men on public works, 
and in 1931 trade union figures showed twenty-nine per 
cent of unionists as unemployed: the true figure of all 
the unemployed was certainly higher. Interest payments, 
formerly about one-fifth of total overseas payments, by 
late 1930 approached one-third. By that date, L.F. Giblin 
feared the possibly permanent loss of a quarter of Australia's 
national income. 4 
The community in general, the Labour movement, and 
even the economists were confused and divided by the 
1 J.H. Scullin's speech in C.P.D., vol. 155, p.480 (8 
December 1937) · 
2 C.P.D., vol. 122, p.119 (21 November 1929); Frank 
Anstey 1 Memoirs, 'The First Week', p.1, and :The Cheery 
Optimistsf, p.1. 
3 Gordon Greenwood (ed.), Australia~ A Social and 
Political History (Sydney, 1955), p.346. 
1~ D.B. Copland and c.v. Janes (eds.), ~tralianTrade 
Policy, 1932-7 (Sydney, ·1937), p.xv; L.F. Giblin, 
'Australia Agonistes', Australian Quarterlx, December 
·1930, pp.7-1"1; L.F. Giblin, The Growth of' a Cel}tr~l. Bank 
(Melbourne, 1951), pp.61-4. 
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Depression. The community was clearly divided between the 
conservatives and the so-called •extr~mists', The· former, 
adhering to orthodox and 'sane' financial views, demanded 
wage cuts to keep production profitable despite the f'all 
in export prices, coupled with balanced budgets despite 
the f'all in revenue, to keep Australia 'honest'. They 
also wanted reductions in social services, but opposed any 
moves to cut interes~ rates, depreciate the currency, or 
expand credit. Regarding the economic 'laws' of' the day 
as being as binding as the laws of physics, 1 they 
prejudged any attempts to develop new financial policies 
as being impractical and indeed immoral. They 'could not 
see that the wage-earner possessed any comparable moral 
claim' to that of' capital, 2 and were prepared to reduce 
even further the living standards of the former to protect 
the latter. With unemployment and misery increasing, 
combined with the activities of •extremists', many 
conservatives feared civil disorder and even revolution, 3 
which made the more pragmatic willing t6 compromise by 
accepting a policy that included the reduction of' interest 
rates. Right-wing and even some middle-of-the-road Labour 
men, though rejecting the conservative argument that 
1 For example, Sir George Fairbairn to J.A. Lyons, n.d. 
[September, 1931], Lyons PaperJ (c.A.), CP 103 (Series 19) 
Bundle l, Folder F. 
2 P.H. Partridge, 'Depression and War, 1929-19.50', in 
Greenwood, p.3.59; see R.G. Menzies, quoted in Age, 8 
February 19.'.3.'.3. 
3 R.C. Tredwell to Henry L. Stimson, 19 March 1931, 
Foreign Relations of' the United States, 1931 (3 vols., 
Washington, i946), Vol. l, p.844; Sydney Morning Herald 
(S.M.H.), 2.'.3 March 1931; S. Ricketson, Diary, ll May 1932. 
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interest rates should not be reduced, accepted the view 
that wage and even pension cuts were necessary to balance 
the budget. 
As the alternative to deflation, the Labour left-wing 
wanted sufficient credit released to end unemployment. 
This was more a reaction against reductions in living 
standards than a logical and considered plan, and not till 
Oc.tober 1930 did Theodore present the left-wing with a 
policy that could be defended on economic as well as 
emotional grounds. But even Theodore's policy was 
valueless in the political sense, as large-scale credit 
expansion was impossible in the face of unrelenting 
opposition to ev~n moderate and controlled inflation by 
the Senate and the Commonwealth Bank. 
Labour's only policy in 1929 to meet the Depression 
was its opposition to deflationary wage cuts and its faith 
in tariff manipulations to adjust financial difficulties. 
Until the adoption of the Premiers' Plan in June 1931, the 
government drifted from one expedient to another without 
devising a general plan. Both Scullin and Theodore 
thought that tariff and taxation adjustments had greater 
effect than such alternative methods of economic planning 
1 
as the manipulation of the exchange rate. In his 
supplementary budget of November 1929, Theodore 
substantially increased tariffs, and imposed a super-tax 
on higher incomes as well as a company super-tax. 
S~ullin's first comprehensive statement o~ government 
financial policy, on 12 March 1930, enviEaged that further 
Caucus Minutes, J April 1930; E.G. Theodore to L.F. 
Giblin, 4 October 1932, Giblin Papers. 
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tariff increases and minor economies would meet the 
unemployment position. 1 On 3 April, he emphasized that 
his government would pay all its creditors 'no matter what 
sacrifice that may require' and would make Australia live 
. th' 't 2 wi in 1 s means. His budget of 9 July introduced sales 
tax for the f.irst ~ime, and increased tariffs and income 
tax on higher incomes. He still hoped to balance the 
budget, and reiterated that all debts would be met.3 
Scullin's policy was formulated mainly by Theodore, 
who until September 1930 had orthodox financial views, and, 
like Lyons and the Labour Premiers of Victoria and South 
Australia, E.J. Hogan and L.L. Hill, thought that the 
Depression was an unsuitable time for financial 
experiments. As the Depression was outside Australia's 
control, cautious Labour men like Lyons doubted that 
credit manipulation would affect its basic causes, or do 
more than alarm Britain, on whom Australia relied for 
trade and capital. Many reluctantiy agreed with Sir Otto 
Niemeyer of the Bank of England, who visited Australia in 
August 1930 to advise the governments on financial policy, 
that the Depression made a large reduction in government 
4 
spending and in wage levels unavoidable. Theodore, the 
leading opponent of inflationary policies, insisted that 
C.P.D., vol. 123, pp.26-JO. 
2 C.P.D., vol. l2J, pp.821-830; see also Caucus Minutes, 
3 April 19JO. 
3 C.P.D., vol. 125, p.3904 (9 July 1930), vol. 126, 
p.4715 (25 July 1930). 
4 Sir Otto Niemeyer's speech to Premiers' Conference, 
August 19JO, Commonwealth, Treasury, 30/4216. 
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any inflation would increase unemployment and cause 
eventual ruin: he ~ejected as 'not practicable' a motion 
before Caucus in May to make £20,000,000 credit available 
through the Commonwealth Bank for public works. 1 The 
2 left-wing bitterly attacked his orthodoxy. When he 
resigned as Treasurer in July 19JO after being accused of 
corruption in connection with the Mungana mines when 
Premier of Queensland, Scullin took his portfolio and 
continued his policies; in August, Scullin signed the 
Melbourne Agreement with the premiers by which all. the 
Australian governments promised to balance their budgets 
within a year. Before leaving for England to attempt to 
restore London's confidence in Australia's determination 
to meet its obligations, Scullin at his last Cabinet 
meeting in August obtained approval for immediate cuts in 
government spending. 3 
Scullin 1 s policy was bitterly oppo~ed by • growing 
mi:nori ty in Caucus. 4 This minority failed to reco~ize 
that, in D.B. Copland's words, financial policy during 
the Depression was 'controlled by the banks, n~t by 
governments'. 5 Immediately Labo•ur was elected, the 
Caucus Minutes, 14 May 1930. 
2 For example, C.P.D., vol. 123, p.134 and p.137 (lJ 
March 1930); vol. 124, p,2732 (13 June 1930), 
3 Treasury memorandum on Revision of Budget, n.d. 
[September 1930], Lyons Papers, file 20. 
4 See voting figures in Caucus Minutes, 21 May 19JO, 12 
June l9JO, and 16 July 19JO. 
5 Argus, 12 December l9J1. 
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Commonweal th Bank emphasized that it would provide the 
short-term credit needed to meet government deficits only 
if government spending was drastically reduced. 1 Sir 
Robert Gibson, who greatly inf'luenced Lyons and Scullin, 
regarded economists as 'tiresome fellows' , 2 and rejected 
most of' their views as unorthodox, relying on traditional 
deflationary methods to bring Australia out of the 
Depression. However, Scullin 1 in denyin~ allegations by 
his followers that Gibson's policy was e~clusively one of 
wage and pension cuts, said that some of the more 
conservative policies were imposed on Gibs~n by his 
Board. 3 Certainly Gibson did adopt some policies then 
unorthodox, including the reduction of bank and loan 
interest rates, and to counter rumours in 1931 that the 
Bank might close its doors he announced that he would 
inflate the note issue to any extent necessary to prevent 
4 the Bank's collapse. Scullin was convinced that Gibson's 
re-appointment as Chairman of the Bank Board was essential 
to restore confidence in government finance, and, ignoring 
Frank Anstey, Memoirs, 'The First Week', p.l. 
2 Herald, 16 December 1932. 
3 C. P. D. , vol. 
vol. 14.5, p . .537 
i4L~, p.21 (28 .June 1934); 
(24 November 1934). 
see also C . P . D . 1 
4 Commonwealth, Official Publications: Conference of 
Commonwealth and State Ministers held at Melbourne, 2.5 May 
to 11 June 19Jl. Proceedings and Decisions of Conference, 
p.132; Sir Robert Gibson to J,H. Scullin, 12 February 1931, 
Commonwealth, Treasury, Register, file Jl/9.50; S.M.H., 
4 May 1931. 
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Caucus 1 wishes, he secretly re-appointed Gibson before 
leaving for England. 1 
64 
Scullin departed for England on 26 August, leaving 
J.E. Fenton as Acting Ppime Minister, and Lyons as Acting 
Treasu~er. Lyons was elevated because of the 
administrative competence he had shown a$ Treasurer of 
Tasmania, but Fenton's elevation reflected only his party 
seniority and his friendship with Scullin. As Fenton 
lacked any qualities of leadership, Lyons was by default 
the principal minister in a situation that a politician 
with greater experience and influence in federal politics 
would have had considerable diff~culty in handling. With 
Scullin and two leading ministers in England, and Theodore 
in ~ueensland fighting for his political life, Caucus• 
uneasy cohesion ended. Unlike Theodore and Beasley, Lyons 
had no group of: supporte'.):'s, an<;l lacked the prestige that 
enabled Scullin to retain the allegiance of all factions; 
he was therefore unable to control Caucus. 
By September a majority of Caucus h~d turned against 
Scullin's orthodox financial policy, which Lyons was 
pledged by the Melbourne Agreement to continue. The 
financial position was deteriorating, with a deficit of 
£12, 000, 000 possible, and Treasury Bills had to be used to 
provide short-term oredit. To balance the budget, 
stringent ec~nomies were unavoidable. The state 
governments, realizing that they would have to reduce the 
salaries 0£ their employees, wanted equivalent cuts in 
Commonweal th salaries to save them f'rotn poli tioal 
1 
See Kim Beasley's article in Canber~a Times, 22 February 
1966, p.8; Argu~ 1 2 January 1934. 
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embarrassment. But orthodox deflation was now rejected 
b~ Caucus, and Lyons had to investigate new theories which 
might provide an acceptable compromise. 
1 I know little about finance' , he said when leaving 
2 the Labour Party. But although largely unfamiliar with .. 
financial theory, his long experience as Treasurer of 
Tasmania conditioned his understanding of the Depression. 
He regarded Australia as being in the same position as 
Tasmania had been in 1923, a view supported by D. B. 
Copland, 3 and he intended to continue the orthodox 
policies successfully used to overcome the depressed 
Tasmanian economy. When criticized, he quoted his 
Ta~1manian success as proof that he had a better 
understanding of economics than his opponents. 4 But as 
his Tasmanian experience .had been relatively resti.:.~icted, 
the complexity of the Depression puzzled him, and only 
after some time could he finally choo~e between the 
conflicting theorie$ being advanced about such questions 
as c;t:'edi t expansion and the rate o:f exchange. Because of 
his 1!lxperience and moral scruples, he opposed plans to 
avoid meeting interest payr11ents. 1 which he believed would 
destroy Australia 1 s credit overseas, and he insisted that 
J.T. Heathershaw to J.A. Lyons, 8 August 1930, 
Commonwealth, Treasury, 30/3973. 
2 c. p. D. , vol. 128, p. 238 ( 13 March 1931) · 
3 J.A. Lyons, quoted in Mercury, 28 October 1929, p.7; 
D. B. Copland to J .A. Lyons, 14 October 1929, Lyons Papers, 
:file J. 
4 For example, c :p. D. , vol. 129, p. 1715 and p .1720 ( 8 May 
1931). 
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any credit expansion must be both limited and tightly 
controlled. 1 
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As in Tasmania, he was more willing than most other 
Labour members to heed the advice of economists and 
businessmen. The Depression was the greatest crisis of 
his political career, and he wanted to have a clear 
understanding of all the possible alternatives before 
deciding his policy. He relied completely on expert 
advi1::e for making a specific financial plan in accordance 
with the general policies he had followed in Tasmania, and 
then attempted, in opposition to the normal Federal Labour 
procedure, to secure its adoption by emphasizing its 
moderate, 'national', non-party nature. He wanted all 
parties to replace their more intransigent postures with a 
compromise 'national' policy that would unite all factions 
to fight the crisis. 
The economists he consulted were agreed that Australia 
could do no more than mitigate the effects of the 
Depression until a rise in export prices and a resumption 
of capital inflow restored the nation's financial 
equilibrium. Their general view was that budgets must be 
balanced, wage levels must fall in accordance with the 
fall in price levels, interest rates must be reduced, the 
exchange rate of the Australian pound with sterling must 
be allowed to depreciate, and a degree of controlled 
inflation should be used to ease the severe deflation. 
Lyons was influenced most by the partly conflicting advice 
of L.F. Giblin and Sir Robert Gibson. Giblin, then at the 
1 See J,A, Lyons' article in Australian National Review, 
21 September 2931, p.2J. 
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University of Melbourne, had discussed the financial 
situation with Lyons during 1930, and on 1 September 
offered to help him to work out a policy against the 
Depression. Like most of his advisers, Giblin was 
influenced by considerations other than the purely 
economic, for he feared 
a bad smash with a chance of revolution and 
chaos. I think a preak-up of the Labour Party 
is almost inevitable. I think you are about our 
last hope of a peaceful so:ution. 
J.B. Brigden, D.B. Copland, H.W. Gepp, and Edward Dyason, 
with whom Giblin was discussing the financial situation, 
1 
were all 'badly scared' His advice was to resist any 
attempt to return to the gold standard, which Austi~alia 
had left in December 1929, and to resistboth deflation 
and 'wild' inflation, while using controlled and moderate 
inflation to stabilize prices at the 1929 level. 2 He 
believed that wage cuts were imperative to reduce 
production costs.3 Dyason, Brigden, Copland, Gepp, and 
L.G. Melville gave similar advice in discussion and 
correspondence, all warning against uncontrolled inflation.4 
1 L.F. Giblin to J.A. Lyons, 1 September 1930, Lyons 
Papers, file 20. 
2 L.F. Giblin to J,A. Lyons, 4 September 1930, Lyons 
Papers, filo 20. 
3 L.F. Giblin to E.R. Walker, 19 April 1934; L.F. Giblin, 
'The Myth of the Premiers' Plan', typescrip article dated 
6 November 1942, Giblin Papers. 
4 L.F. Giblin to J.A. Lyons, 1 September 1930; E.c. 
Dyason to J.A. Lyons, with enclosure, 4 September 1930, 
Lyons Papers, file 20; Herald, 26 May 19Jl. 
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On 18 September, Giblin, Dyason, and Copland sent 
Lyons a plan for economic re-adjustment involving a ten 
per cent cut in real wages as a prerequisite for :r.'educing 
unemployment, a graduated super-tax on income from 
property, a twenty per cent increase in the exchange 
rate with sterling, and the release of' Commonwealth Bank 
credit to stabilize prices, sustain the cash reserves of 
the trading banks, and permit bank advances on sound 
security. They warned yet again of' the dangers of 
uncontrolled inflation. 1 This memorandum, as Giblin 
later commented, was 'pigeon-holed effectively', 2 because 
although Lyons presented a policy to Caucus which 
include,d these recommendations plus the reduction of 
interest rates, 3 Theodore's more spectacular but less 
pract=!-cal plan won majority support. 
The principal Treasury officials also recommended 
wage, pension, and interest cuts, and emphasized the 
dangers of' inflation, 4 whil€• Sir Robert Gibson, who worked 
closely with Lyons and perhaps influenced him more even than 
Giblin, warned him against inflation, and strefigthened his 
D.B. Copland, E.C. Dyason, and L~F. Giblin, 
Economic Reconstruction', typescript memorandum 
September 1930, Lyons Papers, file 20. 
2 Giblin, Central Bank, p.95 
3 Caucus Minutes, 28 October 1930. 
'Plan for 
dated 18 
4 J .T. Heathershaw to J .A. Lyons, 30 August 1930 and 11 
SeptBmber 1930• H.J. Sheehan to J.A. Lyons, 4 September 
1930" and memo~andum on the economic position, 30 October 
1930; C.H. Wickens to J .. E. Fenton, 24 October 1930, an~ 
memorandum on the economic plans, n.d., Lyons Papers, file 
20. 
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resistance to the left-wing. 1 These general principles of 
wage, p~nsion, and interest cuts combined with moderate 
reflation were the most radical that most economists were 
prepared to recommend in 1930. The Premiers' Plan of 
1931, which incorporated these proposals, 'saved the 
economic structure of Australia', in the opinion of John 
Maynard Keynes, who in 1932 was •not prepared to dispute 
that another dose of the same medicine may be necessary'. 
Like the Australian economists, Keynes did not expect an 
early rise in export prices, and wrote that if' he were 
advising Lyons he would be 'decidedly moderate in my 
views•. 2 Gibli~, who first met Keynes in 1918, 
corresponded with him during the Depression, and was 
pleased that Keyne~ •very warmly' agreed with his general 
policy.3 Although Giblin and his associate~ wanted to 
moderate Gibson's almost exclusively deflationary views, 4 
Caucus' unpredictable vacillations after October 1930 made 
I them fear that Labour might begin, unintentionally but by 
I' an unwise decision, a period of' uncontrolled inflation. 
They therefore supported Lyons and the Opposition against 
1 Information given by Dame Enid Lyons; J.A. Lyons, 
quoted in Argus, 30 August 1934, and Victorian Chamber of 
Manufacturers' Gazette, 24 December 1934, p.5; J.A. Lyons 
to E.M. Lyons, n.d. [?26 October 1930], Lyons Papers, 
miscellaneous f'ile~ 
Article by J.M. Keynes in S.M.H., 27 June 1932. 
3 L.F. Giblin, 1 John Maynard Keyne,s: Some Personal Notes', 
Economic Record, vol. 22, June 1946, p.2; L.F. Giblin to 
Edith Giblin, 6 July 19,2, Giblin Papers. 
4 See T. Hytten, 'Giblin as an Economist', in D.B. 
Copland (ed.), Giblin, p.16~. 
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Theodore and Lang, and, at least in public, emphasized 
the need for deflation rather than reflation. 
The advice he reeeived supported Lyons' 
preconceptions about what were suitable Depression 
policies. In September 19JO, he feared that before the 
end of the year the banks would ba unable to advance any 
more credit for the government, and was warning fellow 
Labour members that incautious credit expansioq would 
cause a similar financial collapse to that of Germany in 
1922. 1 At the Victorian Labour Conference on 14 
September, he stated that his financial policy would 
I include steps to balance the budget, cut expenses, 
safeguard credit, and help private enterprise to provide 
work; he had arranged for Sir Otto Niemeyer to advise the 
government on ways to reduce interest. He advocated the 
expansion of the note issue to market Australian produce, 
as long as such expansion did not lead to inflation. 2 
While having some success in persuading the banks to cut 
interest rates, he could not get an agreement to raise 
3 
exchange rates to help the farmers. A Cabinet sub-
committee consisting of himself, Fenton, F.M. Forde, and 
J.J. Daly investigated the financial position, and adopted 
the economists' proposals in principi;]-. When announcing 
on 2 October that Cabinet had accepted the sub-
committee's report, Fenton said that the government would 
1 J.A. Lyons to J.L. Price, 27 September 1930, Lyons 
Papers 1 file 20. 
2 Age, 15 September 1930. 
3 1 128 pp.2~4-5 (13 March 1931); Giblin, c . p. D. I VO • ' .J 
Central nank, p.76. 
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reduce its spending by £4,000,000. 1 Lyons was prepared to 
resign from Cabinet if SculJ.in did not support his 
financial proposals, but Scullin accepted all ~ave the 
planned pension cuts. Lyons regarded this decision as 
'unsatisfactory but not hopeless. If we can get bank 
assi:3tance on that basis, then Scullin will have to reduce 
pensions himself in a few months'. 2 
.Scullin and the majority of Cabinet had accepted the 
principle of wage cuts, but most Caucus members, 
' frustrated and bewildered b~ the economic difficulties, 
were unwilling to continue orthodox deflationary policies, 
even if modified as Lyons intended. Ho~ever; in late 
October, Lyons told his wife that whiJ.e,he £eared Caucus' 
attitude, with Scullin's support he hoped to 1win through 
without a smash 1 ,3 To his annoyance, Caucus refused to 
meet until after the New South Wales eiection, 4 which Lang 
won on 25 October. Lang's victory heartened the left-wing, 
for he was regarded as a radical, although later the 
sincerity of his 'radicalism' became suspect. His 
financial proposals were at least partly intended td 
weaken Theodore's power in New South Wales, and as Lang 
became more 'radical', so did Theodore, who feared the 
Herald, 2 Oc•tober 1930. 
~!. J.A. Lyon8 to I~~!. Lyons, n.d. [?26 October 1930], Lyons 
Papers, miscellaneous file. 
3 J.A. Lyons to E.M. Lyons, n.d. 
Lyons Papers, miscellaneous file. 
[?26 October 1930], 
4 See J.A. Lyons* speech in C.P.D., vol. 128, p.232 (13 
March 1931). 
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decline of his influence in Caucus 
Lyon'3 and Theodore had had similar 
and i! New South Wales. \l,,~i:~ 
financial experiences 
as state leaders, both resisting union pressure to change 
working conditions and carrying out cqnserva.tive f'inancial 
policies~ Theodore, unlike Lyons, even reduced wages. l 
But Theodore's f'inancia.l brilliance enabled him to 
c·omprehend new economic theories that to Lyons' more 
orthodox mind were heretical and da.n,ger ous. 
Under the stimulus of' Lang and with the help of' R.F. 
Irvine, a former Professor of Economics at Sydney 
Uni ve1'si ty, Theodore after he resign~d as Treasurer 
reversed his earlier policies. Irvine, who had been in 
touch with him f'rom early September, 2 was the strongest 
Australian ~dvo~ate 6f' rontrolled large-scale credit 
expansion. When dei::-iding his policy be:foret Caucus met in 
0( t ob er, Lyons was unaware of' Ir•vine 's '\~iews ~ as these 
were first made public in December 19JO, and Irvine did 
not rommunicate with the Treasury on Depression policy 
until Febru.:tt•y l9Jl. J Theodore adopted Irvine 1 s policy, 
at least partly as a political counter to Lang and Lyons, 
and when Caucus met on 27 October, two days a.f'ter Lang's 
~ictory, he engineered the defeat of LyonA' proposals. 
A.:; Anstey lq- 1r wrote. Theodore 1 s resign<J.tion £rom Cabinet 
t E.M. Higgins, 'The Queensland Labour Govet'nments,1915.., 
19d9' lM.A. thesis, Uni\ersity of Melbourne, 1954), 
pp.65-6. 
'J Bruce M{Fnlane, Rr:£f~£r-1£:Yine 1 s E,gonomic5 i:U, ~ustralia.n b&s>,E!-l!istofY.i.-121J..=l.21l (canJ:,erra, 1966); 
p.19. 
J !!abo!__QJl.lX• 6 DeC'entl1?r 19JO~ .'R"·F·: I1v·in~ ;-~E.G. 
1'lH"odure. 2J Fot.ruar.y 1931, Comn10nwealth, Tiea<:>ury, 
Regi5ter. file 311106~. 
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began the Labour split, for without Theodore and his 
'heelers' the left was 'harmless' and could not have 
defeated Cabinet's plans.1 
73 
On 27 October, Caucus discussed the government's 
financial administration, and carried a resolution 
rejecting Sir Otto Niemeyer's deflationary policy, which 
many Labour members believed the government had adopted. 
On the following day, Cabinet completely lost its earlier 
control over Caucus, partly because Cabinet itself was no 
longer unitedg two ministers, Anstey and Beasley, led the 
members of Caucus who opposed Scullin's financial policies. 
Immediately Caucus resumed, H.P. Lazzarini proposed that 
the Commonwealth Bank release sufficient credit or notes 
to meet the £28,000,000 loan falling due on 15 December. 
Lyons at once moved an amendment,· seconded by Senator John 
Barnes, Federal President of the A.W.U., that the party's 
policy should be unpegged exchange rates, ~tabilization of 
internal prices by monetary control, reduction of interest 
rates, and provision of credits for industry by the 
Commonwealth Bank. This was a radical policy for 1930, 
and might not have been accepted by the Senate or the 
Commonwealth Bank. However, Theodore was not to be out-
manoeuvered, and immediately a more radical amendment 
f'rfmed and seconded by him; though moved by the moderate 
G.A. Gibbons, proposed that the Commonwealth Bank provide 
£20,000,000 for public works, credit for industry, and 
sufficient credit to meet all maturing internal loans and 
all government expenditure. He also proposed a rise in 
exchange rates. His final proposal 11 to stalk.lize wages 
1 
Frank Anstey, Memoirs, r The Transf<>rma ti on 1 , p. 4. 
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and salaries at the 1929 level, was withdrawn,,. perhaps 
because of Lyons 1 similar plan. 1 
Theodore must ha:ve known that his £20,000,000 
suggestion, let alone his plan for sufficient credits to 
meet all internal loans and government expenditure, would 
never pass the Senate nor· be accepted by the Commonweal th 
Bank; the situation in parliament had not changed since 
May, when he had re,iected as 'not practicable' a motion. 
before Caucus to issue £20,000,000 credit. 2 His proposals 
were basically meant.to serve a political purpose, 
although he may have regarded some of the proposals as 
economically feasible and necessary. His amendment was at 
once successful polit~cally: Lazzarini withdrew his motion 
in f'avour of the GibborJ.S Plan, which now gained the 
suppGrt of the left and· the swinging vote in Caucus. On 
28 October, Lyons' attempt to reduce federal public 
service salaries was defeated, although supported by 
Theodore. However, on the morning of' 30 October 3 Caucus 
agreed to reduce parliamentary salaries by ten per 
cent and ministerial by fifteen per cent. Lyons' 
f'inancial proposals were defeated at this meeting, 
and the Gibbons Plan adopted by twenty-six votes 
to fourteen.3 The left-wing attacked Theodore f'or 
adopting now what he had earlier denounced, but 
had no choice except to support his plan. 4 Lyons 
emphasizing that his policy was inherited. from Theodore, 
Caucus Minutes, 28 October 1930. 
2 Caucus Minutes, 14 May 1930. 
3 Caucus Minutes, 27-30 October 1930. 
4 Frank Anstey, Memoirs, 'The Transformation', p.1. 
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later condemned Theodore's new plans as 'merely the 
figment of a fertile imagination. There is nothing real 
or practical in any of them'. 1 
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Thus on the afternoon of 30 October, Lyons, without a 
policy to present, faced a parliament re-assembled to 
debate the government's financial policy. He felt 
humiliated at having to adjourn the House to allow time 
for the working out of a new policy acceptable to Caucus. 2 
Opposi tion.:)members strongly criticized Cabinet's 
embarrassing position, but were cut short when E.C. Riley, 
the Government Whip, applied the gag. Angered by this 
high-handedness, Lyons asked Riley to withdraw the gag, 
but the Opposition refused permission; with Allan Guy he 
then voted with the Opposition against the gag~3 
Caucus met immediately after parliament adjourned, 
and at last agreed that the salaries of senior public 
servants should be cut by the same amount as parliamentary 
and ministerial salaries. 4 This vote was a victory for 
Lyons, who had threatened to resign if cuts were not 
approved . .5 The Caucus decisions were sent to Scullin, who 
cabled his dissatisfaction that greater economies had not 
been authorized. 6 When Caucus met nn 6 November, Fenton 
read Scullin's cable, but Caucus was unimpressed. After 
Ibid. ; Argus, 16 March 1931. 
2 See J.A. Lyons' speech 
March 1931). 
in c.P.D., vol.128, p.232 (13 
3 C.P.D., vol.. 127, p.25; Age, 31 October 1930. 
4 Caucus Minutes, .'.30 Octobe~ 1930. 
5 Sun News-P1.ctorial,. JO October 1930. 
6 J,H. Scullin~s cable quoted in S.M.H., 16 March .1931, 
,;;~ 
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Lyons explained his intention to convert the loan coming 
due on 15 December, Caucus carried by twenty-two votes to 
sixteen a motion combining the views 0£ Anstey and John 
Curtin, that the Commonweal th Bank meet the loan, failing 
which it should be ::t"enewed f'or twelve months by legislative 
action. 
1 
Theodore, who voted with Lyons against this 
motion, 
2 
had himself temporarily lost control over Caucus 
to the lef't-wing1 he had intended to use bank credit to 
meet internal loans only, and, like Lyons, saw the Caucus 
resolution as repudiation. Anstey later admitted that 
his motion was 1 as futile as all the others'~ for he had 
momentarily forgotten that Labour had, no power • .3 After 
the vote, Lyons and Fe,nton told Caucus that 'they would 
consider their position', Lyons adding that he refused 
to obey the decision, and would continue w:i th his previous 
plans: to convert the December loan1 if Scullin su:pported 
Caucus 1 decision, he would resign f'rom Cabinet. 4 However 1 
Scullin and the other two ministers in London endo.rsed 
his stand, and Scullin, af'ter publicly praising hint for 
1 facing his ·task manfully', re-af'f'irmed that .Australia 
would honour all its obligations • .5 The Loan Council~ 
including Lang, on 11 November unanimously supported 
the conversion of' the loan. 
Caucus Minutes, 6 November 1930. 
2 He!'al,S, 7 November 1930. 
Frank Anstey~ Me1moirs r 'The Transformation t,. P• 2. 
4 Qaucus Mirtutes,, 6 November 19JO; Herald, 7 November 
1930 • 
.5 J.,H. Scullin'~ cable quoted in S.M.H., 16 March 1931; 
Arguhs,i 13 November 19JO. 
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Caucus on 12 November was informed by Fenton of the 
Loan Council's decision, and of Cabinet's unanimous view 
that there should not be a party crisis while Scullin was 
overseas. However, the left-wing, and many moderates were 
cr£tical of Lyons 1 defiance of Ca~cus, and a resolution 
was moved that effect be given to the Anstey-Curtin motion 
of 6 November, Fenton then read the cables between 
himself' and Scullin, in which Scullin had denounced. this 
resolution as 'repudiation, which is dishonest and 
disastrous 1 • 1 On Curtin's advice, the motion was then 
withdrawn, and Caucus agreed to adjou!'n the question until" 
2 Scullin 1 s return. Lyons wished to avoid further disputes 
by ending the current sitting of parliament as soon as 
possible, but Caucus successfully insisted that parliament 
should not adjourn until concrete assistance was given to 
the unemployed.3 Lyons' supplementa~y budget of 5 November 
had done little to ease the crisis, for its economies, 
cuts in parliamentary and public service salaries; and 
super-tax on property s~ill left a probable deficit of 
£lt, 000, 000. Suell a budget in his eyes did .not honour the 
Melbourne Agreement, and he again contemplated resignation 
from Cabinet. The budget 'was for him, in the purely 
personal sense, a humiliation, but £or the nation, as he 
4 believed, nothing short 0£ a tragedy'. The caucus 
majority was now unlik:ely to compromise with him, a.nd the 
1 J.H. Scullin's cable quoted in S.M.H., 16 March 19.:n. 
2 Caucus Minutes, 12 November 19JO. 
3 Caucus Minutes, 20 November 19JO, 
4 Lyons, p.163. 
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press was full 0£ rumours 0£ moves to remove him, Fenton, 
and even Scullin from Cabinet, 
The December Conversion Loan, on the success 0£ which 
he had staked his politic al career, was a great personal 
triumph :for Lyons. The banks had warned him that it was 
very dot1bt:f'ul whether the 101;1.n would succeed, 1 but his 
vigorous campaigning resul.ted in the ove:r'-subscription of' 
the £28,000,000 loan by £1,750,280. He regarded this 
success as a vindication by the public 0£ his financial 
policies. During the loan campaign, he had stated that 
those who believed in 'sound methods of f'inance 1 were on 
trial and must make the loan. successf'uJ., and he worked 
2 1'1ith Melbourne businessmen to this end. As in Tasmania, 
he wanted co-operation between all parties to fight the 
Depression, and in parlia.ment he was careful not tq 
antagonize the Opposition. 3 On 4 December, he stated that 
having long wanted to place the interests of' Australia 
before that 0£ party, he was judging policies from an 
. 4 
'Australian 1 standpoint. Other' federal. Labour men .felt 
that to seek a solution to the Depression in consultation 
with the Opposition would suggest that Labour could not 
handle the crisis, a oonclusiol1 which they denied, 
1 J.A. Lyons' speech in O.P.D., vol. 132, p.825 (16 
October 1931). 
2 S.M.H. 1 9. December 1930; see p.87 and p.90. 
3 J.A. Lyons, quot~d in Advocate, 2 January 1931, and ~IDi!,1 
7 January 1931; see C.P.D. ~ vol. 127, pp,84,), 8l~7 and 8.57 
(28 November J.930), and pp.1172-4 (9 December 19:30), 
4 C.P.D., vol. 127, p.1000~ 
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However, Lyons had not claimed when Premier of Tasmania 
that only his party had the answer to Tasmania's 
financial decay, and he was convinced that the federal 
party could not tackle the Depression unaided. Even if 
it had possessed an acceptable financial policy, he 
would still have urged it to seek the support of the 
Opposition: to him a financial crisis was a time for 
unity in the national interest. Assistance should be 
sought from economists and businessmen, because he 
believed that many of them had a clearer understanding 
of the Depression than most Labour men; he was 
convinced that the Labour platform did not give a 
practical guide to the economic and political problems 
facing the government. 
On 9 December, Latham suggested the formation of 
an all-party Advisory Council, to include representatives 
of government and Opposition, of all the states, and of 
the banks, to work out a united policy against the 
Depression. Lyons supported this move to, in his words, 
'drop party•, 1 and Scullin had made a similar suggestion 
2 
on 1 2 March and 3 April, and, with the approval of Caucus, 
was to repeat the offer on 14 May 1931. On 28 April 1931, 
Scullin said that his government would drop I every plank 
of its policy' if the Nationalists could suggest a way to 
end the Depression. 3 However, Caucus in December 1930 
was satisfied that it knew how to overcome the crisis, 
and scornfully rejected Latham•s suggestion. On the 
1 J.A. Lyons' speech in O.P.D., vol.132, p.630 (9 
October 19:31). 
2 Caucus Minutes, 14 May 19.'.31 • 
3 C.P .. D. J vol.i29, p.1319. 
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following day, the Canberra Times and Lang's Labor 
Dai.J,y reported that Lyons in Caucus had advocated a 
coalition government, but he emotionally denied the 
allegation a:s 'a downright lie; absolutely and 
emphatically a lie 1 • 1 His relations with his opponents 
were now almost beyond compromise, and in Caucus on that 
same day he challenged them to move a vote of' no-
conf'idence in the government: nobody responded, but 
Theodore and Curtin were elected as financial advisers 
to Cabinet. 2 
In October, before his clash with Caucus, Lyons 
had written to his wife about how 'heavenly' it would 
be if' he could go back to Devonport 'f'or good'.3 He 
was very unhappy in federal politics, missing the peace 
and friendline~s of' Tasmania. When standing f'o:r election 1 
he had said that if' the party went beyond Scullin's 
election policy, he would resign, 4 and by late 1930 he 
was seriously contemplating resignation from Cabinet, 
although not yet from the party. Unable to support 
some government policies,5 opposed to its unwillingness 
to heed the advice of' people outside the pa.:t•ty, and 
defeated in his attempt to carry out Scullin's wishes, 
he would have resigned from Cabinet over Caucus' 
C.P.D., vol.127, pp.1349-9 (11 December 1930). 
2 Herald, 11 December 1930. 
3 J.A. Lyons to E.M. Lyons, n.d. [? 26 October 1930], 
Lyons Papers, miscellaneous file. 
4 Mercury, 4 October 1929, p.10. 
5 See J.A. Lyons' speech in C.P.D., vol.128f p.231 
(13 March 1931). 
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November decisions if' Scullin had not been overseas. 1 
Theodore he suspected o:f reversing his earlier policies 
:for political ends, and there was the likelihood that 
Caucus, through the rivalry o:f Theodore and Lang, would 
adopt :further 'extremist' policies. To his protests 
that inflation and repudiation o:f just debts would ruin 
Australia, Anstey replied: 'Default and be damned' . 2 
His conviction that the le:ft-wing did not reflect 
general Labour views was supported by the backing he 
received from Scullin, E.J. Hogan and L.L. Hill, an 
exhortation from Phil Collier, Labour's leader in 
~1 
Western Australia, to' 1 stand solid whatever the 
consequences' , 3 and the approval o:f his old Tasmanian 
Labour supporters. Being prepared to repudiate party 
discipline i:f party policy was unacceptable, he could 
remain. in the party only i:f Scullin on returning :from 
England continued to support him against Caucus. 
Scullin on his return praised the loyalty and 
achievements of' Lyons and Fenton, and reiterated that 
the government 
obligations. 4 
justi:fied his 
must economize and meet all its 
However, although these statements 
stand 1 Lyons had endured enough as Acting 
Treasurer; at a dinner in his honour given by his 
Tasmanian supporters on 8 January 1931, he said 
1. Lyons, p.163. 
2 Labor Daily, 7 January 1931 • 
3 Phil Collier to J.A. Lyons, 10 November 1930, Lyons 
Papers, f'ile 3. 
4 For example, Argus, 21 January 1931. 
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that his knowledge of economics had been 'much over-
rated', and that he was willing to stand down for 
82 
someone who could do better. 1 Immediately on Scullin's 
return, he asked to be replaced at the Treasury so that 
he could return to his old portfolios. 2 After greeting 
Scullin and handing over his portf'olio on 12 January, he 
sp8nt two weeks resting at Devonport, as the strain of 
combatting Caucus had affected his health.3 However, 
although he had left the Treasury, he did not intend to 
remain silent should Labour attempt to introduce unorthodox 
solutions, and on 13 January he announced that he would 
fight inflation in parliament, even if this meant he 
h would be expelled from the party. 
During Lyons' absence in Tasmania, there were 
rumours that Scullin would support mild inflation, but 
on 15 January in a speech at Ashfield he supported 
'sane' finance and opposed inflation. 5 Lyons expected 
him to continue his 1930 policy, and thereby oppose 
Theodore, who had engineered the rejection of Scullin's 
policy and who said on 12 January that 'Australia today 
't 6 needs not£20,000,000 but £120,000,000 1 extra credi • 
However, Scullin, who had never beJ.ieved in the Mungana 
Advocate, 9 January 1931· 
2 Advocate, 2'.3 January 1931; J.A. Lyons' speech in 
C.P.D., vol.128, p.236 (13 March 1931). 
1 · A 1 April 19'.31' Denning, p.31. J.M. Gabb, quoted in rgusr ' 
h Herald, 1 3 January 1931. 
5 S.M.H., 16 January 1931. 
6 S.M.H., 1) January 1931. 
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allegations, was drawing closer to Theodore, who had 
been his chie:f lieutenant until July 1930. He may have 
thought that to bring him back into Cabinet would end 
the party disunity, 1 :for Theodore's exclusion had led 
to the lef't-wing victories. Being out o:f touch with 
the political situation, Scullin did not realize the 
strength of' the opposition to Theodore :from both Lyons' 
small group and the Lang supporters. Theodore probably 
encouraged him to believe that his reappointment would 
restore party unity; Lyons, in Tasmania, was ignorant 
o:f and unable to prevent Scullj.n' s realignment. 
When he returned to Canberra :for a special caucus 
meeting on 26 January, Lyons :found that Scullin had 
decided to adopt Theodore's :financial policies and to 
re-appoint him as Treasurer. Lyons was astonished, as 
he :felt that, irrespective of Theodore's earl1er 
disloyalty to Scull1n 1 s policies or his new :financial 
schemes, he could not be reinstated until cleared of 
2 the Mungana charges. He had earlier removed A.G. 
Ogilvie f'rom his Cabinet, and was later to remove A. J. 
McLachlan, :for suspected impropriety. Immediately af'ter 
Scullin asked Caucus to reinstate Theodore, Lyons, 
apparently hoping to defeat Theodore and his Cabinet 
supporters, moved that all Cabinet positions be declared 
··acant and a new Ministry elected. After a long debate, 
he withdrew the motion, perhaps because he saw that he 
had little support. Scullin 1 s recommendation that 
Cabinet prepare a new :t'inancial policy was then accepted, 
2 
See Herald, 23 January 1931 and 26 January 19~3"1 • 
Lyons , p. 1 6 9 • 
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and Theodore was reinstated by twenty-four votes to 
ninete~n, and re-appointed as Deputy Leader of the 
party. 
Moses Gabb at once withdrew from the party, but 
Lyons advised Fenton not to resign without full 
consideration, and himself spent the next two days in 
Canberra trying to decide what action to take, 
associating only with his few supporters. 2 After 
returning to Devenport to inform his wife o:f his 
decision, he resigned from Cabinet on 29 January. 
84 
Fenton resigned on the same day. Scullin was reportedly 
surprised and shocked by the resignations, for he hac:J. 
been told that there was an overwhelming demand for 
Theodore's reinstatement.3 
Thoueh still a member of the party, Lyons could 
not remain a member unless he repudiated his financial 
policies; this he could not do without betraying his 
beliefs, f'or he was convinced that Theodore 1 s to him 
dishonest and dartgerous policies would soon bring the 
complete collapse of the Australian economy, thereby ending 
the hopes o:f' improving the lot of the workers that had 
inspired him to enter politics. He felt betrayed by Scullin 1 s 
change of' policy, and completely disillusioned with the 
Labour P.:u."'ty .. Convinoed that urgell'b steps had to be tak'.en 
to block Theodore's plans, the logic of the situation 
compelled him to consider working with the Opposition 
2 
'j 
Caucus Minutes, 26 Januury 1931. 
Herald, 27 Januar'y 19:31; A.rgus., 28 January 1931. 
See !!£.!:Q..1:.9:, 27 January 1931 and 'l~ Januat~y 1931. 
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